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Abstract 
 
Accounts of structural change in the pre-modern British economy vary substantially. We present the 
first time series of male labour sectoral shares before 1800, using a large sample of probate and 
apprenticeship data to produce national and county-level estimates. England experienced a rapid decline 
in the agricultural share between the early seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, 
associated with rising agricultural and especially industrial productivity; Wales saw only limited changes. 
Our results provide further evidence of early structural change, highlighting the significance of the mid-
seventeenth century as a turning point in English economic development.  
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How can we resolve the puzzle of what happened to the occupational structure of Britain between the 
start of the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth centuries? Few gaps in historical understanding can be 
so large and portend so much for our understanding of the timing and speed of changes in the British 
economy before the industrial revolution. Our current stock of knowledge consists of two estimates 
(drawn from the same source) for the 1520s, one estimate for the 1570s, one for the 1650s, several for 
1688 (all from the same source), and one for the 1710s. This may appear as an excess of riches compared 
to the dearth of information in some countries. Certainly it is a large step from the view taken by Deane 
and Cole that any such attempts were likely impossible due to the lack of evidence (Deane & Cole 1962). 
But several of these estimates are sufficiently different from each other that they suggest mutually 
irreconcilable accounts of economic change. Those for the 1570s and 1660s have been used by Greg 
Clark et al (2012) to argue for the view that Britain experienced no significant economic growth in this 
period. While Steve Broadberry et al (2013, 2015) use evidence from the 1520s, 1688 and later to argue 
that these estimates reveal exactly the opposite: significant structural change and productivity growth. 
Unsurprisingly, the differences between these estimates are related to the varied sources each author has 
relied upon. Clark et al’s analysis uses evidence drawn from probate records –wills and related documents 
- that appear to show a stable share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Their two samples for the 1570s and 1650s both show that the share in agriculture 
in England hovered around 60 percent. Clark et al highlights that England has a relatively high share of its 
workforce outside agriculture from a relatively early period, reflecting a relatively wealthy economy in 
premodern terms. However, the probate evidence, they conclude, supports Clark’s (2007) view that there 
is ”little sign” of economic growth between 1400 and 1800 (Clark et al 2012: 387).  
 
Quite different conclusions emerge from the other sources that have been explored to date. Leigh Shaw-
Taylor and E. A. Wrigley (2014) use information from baptism registers surviving from around 1710 to 
construct an estimate of 43 percent of males in agriculture, well below Clark’s estimate for the 1650s, that 
they suggest implies a large and early shift out of agriculture into services and industry. Broadberry et al 
generated an alternative set of labour force shares for 1522 (using Muster Rolls) and c.1700 (using King’s 
1688 social table). Rather than stability, they identified a fall in the share of the male labour force in 
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agriculture from 68 percent in 1522 to 46 percent circa 1700. Their figure for 1700 is, it is worth noting, 
somewhat lower than the 55.6 percent in agriculture that Crafts estimated using the Lindert and 
Williamson’s revisions to the same source largely because of a different, and likely  more accurate, 
distribution of labourers (Crafts 1985: 13-15; Lindert & Williamson 1983). Broadberry et al’s further 
estimates for 1759 and 1801 suggest that this decline continued across the eighteenth century. Their 
conclusion is, predictably, the opposite of Clark et al’s. Instead of stagnation, they conclude that the “the 
critical occupational migration from agriculture to industry commenced some time after 1522 and had 
already made significant progress by 1700.” This was “consistent with considerable dynamism and growth 
from the sixteenth century to the point in the nineteenth century when modern economic growth began” 
(Broadberry et al 2013: 26). 
In this paper, we show that the apparent conflict between the sectoral estimates that these different 
researchers have reached is in fact illusory. Using a new, larger and more representative sample of probate 
records, we find a pattern of structural change that is consistent with all existing estimates, once they are 
appropriately adjusted. We introduce another new and large source on occupational structure, the 
occupations of London apprentices’ fathers, to benchmark our probate dataset, and show that both 
sources are broadly consistent with each other. The English economy saw rapid and significant structural 
change during the seventeenth century. A high share of the male workforce was in agriculture until the 
late sixteenth century. Movement out of agriculture is visible from c. 1600, and accelerated from before 
the middle of the seventeenth century. The Welsh economy is largely stable over the same period.  
 
SOURCES FOR OCCUPATIONS: PROBATES 
It is a long-established truism that probate records are a complicated and difficult source to use (Lindert 
1981; Goose and Evans 2000). Although abundant, they are affected by serious biases in coverage. 
Probate was a system focused on property, and this meant that women and dependent males (especially 
young adults who might still be legal minors) are seriously under-represented. Men with property, 
particularly capital goods, are significantly over-represented (Keibek and Shaw-Taylor 2013).  Those 
women who do appear are largely widows, and are identified by their status, not their occupation. Poorer 
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men appear with quite different degrees of frequency, in part depending on how energetic the local court 
might be – court officials took fees for registering  wills which varied in proportion to the value of the 
estate (Evans and Goose, 2000; 21 Henry VIII, c.5). 
Research into probate is also afflicted by practical problems. The probate system was set up in a 
complicated manner. England and Wales were divided into multiple jurisdictions. Each area would 
generally be covered by three levels of church court. The court used for an individual’s will depended 
upon the value of the their estate and the number of jurisdictions in which they possessed property. At 
the top, two provincial courts, the Prerogative Court of Canterbury and the Prerogative Court of York 
dealt with the Southern and Northern parts of England respectively. Beneath them, courts fragmented 
over counties, parishes and hundreds of small ‘peculiar’ jurisdictions. For the researcher, one direct effect 
is that the probate records for a county are usually scattered across multiple archives with no single index. 
Another even more concerning consequence is that the volume of probate records that was generated 
was shaped by institutional factors, such as differences in record keeping and enthusiasm for use of the 
courts, as well as the proportion of estates that met the legal criteria for probate. The share of deaths 
generating a probate record changes over time as a result of this, trending down in England and up in 
Wales (figure 1). The decline in use of the probate system during the interregnum, when it was centralised 
to London, emphasizes the role of proximity of a court in influencing whether or not probate carried out 
(Kitching, 1976). 
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Figure 1: Share of Male Deaths in the Probate Dataset 
 
Note: The figure reports estimates by decade of the share of male deceased appearing in the probate record. We 
used Clark’s method to estimate male deaths per decade (see Clark 2012: 368). We present two estimates: the stable 
composition sample holds the counties in the sample constant between 1550 and 1750 for England (n=13) and 1590 
and 1750 for Wales (n=11); the variable composition sample includes all counties for which we have a count of wills 
across three jurisdictions in a particular decade. 
 
Our dataset of probate records is designed to ameliorate the effect of these practical problems. In our 
analysis, we include a county if it meets three criteria. First, we possess probate records for over 75 
percent of the county’s geographical area for each of the three levels of probate jurisdiction (archdeaconry 
or equivalent, consistory and prerogative court).1 Second, wills survive for more than ten percent of male 
deaths. Third, an occupation is reported for more than ten percent of male probate records. For the most 
part, reporting rates are well above this bar: mostly, we know the occupations for over half of male 
probate records for a county. However, for a few counties in the sixteenth century, occupational 
                                                          
1
 Our dataset is summarized in Appendix 1. The dataset was largely created using OCR software and then 
cleaning and structuring the data. The conversion process generates losses at two points. First, the scanning 
and conversion may fail to recognise a line of text. Second, the text may be converted incorrectly. Both types 
of loss are digital versions of the usual problems we face with historical records: gaps, illegibility, variant 
spellings. Fortunately, the effect is relatively slight, and is unlikely to bias our estimates of occupational shares. 
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information is scarce enough to rule them out. We code occupations using Wrigley’s Primary Secondary 
Tertiary system (Wrigley 2004). In our core sample, we are able to code 98.2 percent of occupational 
labels. We identify gender based on status indicators and forenames.2 
After applying these restrictions, our sample contains in excess of 710,000 probate records for male 
testators in in England between 1540 and 1799, and about 100,000 wills from Wales. We exclude the 
substantial share of testators is labelled with titles, such as gentleman or esquire, that indicate high socio-
economic status, not occupation. Not all wills contain an occupational descriptor for the testator, and not 
all indexes include occupations that are reported. There is no sign or suggestion that occupations are 
reported selectively in a way that will bias our results, however.3 The share of non-elite male wills with an 
occupation rises from 31 percent in the 1550s to 60 percent by 1600, and exceeds 80 percent on occasion 
in the eighteenth century. Our final sample of male non-elite wills with a reported and matched 
occupation contains 684,113 observations from 23 English counties and 50,826 from 12 Welsh counties. 
  
                                                          
2
 We allocate the small share (3.4 percent) without a gender identified through forename matching to males, 
as further checking indicates that individuals in this group almost all have rare variants on spellings of male 
forenames. Our results are robust if the sample is restricted to males only. 
3
 The exception to this is the clergy, who are identifiable through titles (eg: Reverend) that are sometimes 
included in indexes where occupations are not otherwise reported. We avoid this by excluding samples where 
less than 10 percent of observations have an occupation reported.  
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Table 1: The Probate Dataset 
 
 
England 
  
Wales 
 
Years 
Obs. Counties 
Share of 
Male Deaths 
Obs. Counties 
Share of 
Male Deaths 
 
N N % N N % 
1540-9 5,508 10 20 19   
1550-9 12,766 11 36 36   
1560-9 9,639 13 22 45   
1570-9 12,316 13 28 123 1 22 
1580-9 16,110 15 31 96 2 18 
1590-9 21,109 14 31 106   
1600-9 22,878 15 28 331 3 18 
1610-9 31,422 17 32 525 4 20 
1620-9 30,138 16 25 520 4 15 
1630-9 30,269 19 30 702 7 18 
1640-9 22,113 16 19 650 6 13 
1650-9 35,854 15 17 794 3 11 
1660-9 36,685 20 22 2,275 12 24 
1670-9 33,589 20 25 2,586 12 25 
1680-9 34,445 18 24 2,955 12 20 
1690-9 31,329 17 24 3,321 12 19 
1700-9 30,354 15 23 3,147 11 17 
1710-9 29,619 14 24 3,431 12 16 
1720-9 37,188 15 27 4,654 12 20 
1730-9 34,367 15 25 3,993 12 19 
1740-9 35,082 14 21 3,648 12 15 
1750-9 24,903 12 18 2,850 12 15 
1760-9 29,799 12 16 3,527 12 16 
1770-9 27,163 13 17 3,300 12 15 
1780-9 24,920 12 14 3,619 11 14 
1790-9 24,548 12 13 3,573 12 14 
 
      
Total 684,113  
24 50,826 
 
18 
 
 
It is useful to briefly compare our dataset to that Clark et al used for their sectoral estimates from probate 
records (Clark et al 2012). There are several major differences. First, our sample is larger by an order of 
magnitude. Clark et al’s evidence contains 16,771 records for 1560-79 and 31,400 for 1652-60. Our data 
includes all of Clark et al’s data for the 1650s and most of it for the 1560s.4 Any variations between our 
                                                          
4
 Several of the sources Clark used are no longer available online. 
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results should thus not be due to us each observing different parts of the country.5 Second, our sample 
covers a wider and more balanced geographical area. Clark et al’s evidence for the 1560s is primarily from 
the south of England. Only one county is in the north, Cheshire, which supplies just 92 wills, equivalent 
to around two percent of male deaths in the county. As figure 2 shows, the counties in our sample cover a 
broad swathe of England, with both south and north captured well. 
Figure 2. Map of Counties in Sample 
 
 
Third, where Clark et al used two samples (1653-1660 and 1560-79) we present a continuous series that 
runs into the eighteenth century. Continuing past 1660 is particularly important, given that the middle of 
the seventeenth century is seen by some as a turning point. One might be tempted to argue that any mid-
seventeenth century shift should already be visible in Clark et al’s 1653-1660 sample. However, because 
wills are mainly generated near death, occupational estimates from probate records will lag the population 
as a whole. Clark’s estimates suggest that the age of probate was 53 years, while the average worker would 
be 39 years old.6  The 1650s estimate is effectively a sample of the occupational structure circa 1638-45. 
                                                          
5
 We have re-estimated Clark’s results for the 1650s and our results match closely. 
6
 Clark 2012, 384. 
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Finally, our data share one limitation: aside from the 1650s, London is not included in our dataset. 
However, unlike Clark et al, we address that in our analysis. 
Although our dataset covers a broader geographical sample than Clark et al, it misses some important 
parts of the country, notably in the midlands and Yorkshire. There is no easy way to be sure about how 
well our sample represents the sectoral distribution of the country as a whole. Wrigley’s recently 
published county population estimates for 1600 onwards do suggest one rough test (Wrigley 2007, 2009). 
Given that population growth is likely to be concentrated in counties where economic change is occurring 
most rapidly, we would expect that estimates taken from our sample will underestimate sectoral change at 
a national level if the population of the sampled counties grows more slowly than the population of 
counties outside, and vice versa. For 1600 to 1700, the average growth in the population of counties in 
our sample was 23percent compared to 22percent for counties outside our sample. For 1700 to 1750, 
counties in our sample grew substantially faster than those outside the sample (18percent vs 11percent), 
while after 1750 counties in our sample lagged those outside (34percent vs 46percent). On this basis, we 
feel relatively confident about the validity of the sample for the seventeenth century, which is the period 
we are most concerned to address. We are less confident about its quality after 1700. 
To what extent can we estimate occupational structure from the occupations reported in probate records? 
Probate is not a randomly generated sample, but, as we stressed above, is strongly influenced by wealth 
and capital-holding. Because of their bias towards the wealthy, probate records will under-represent the 
poor and since the extent to which they cover the population varies over time (and space) so does this 
bias. This impact of selection bias is most obvious in estimates of occupational shares, but trends can 
potentially be biased, too. On the one hand, economic growth might push the shares of individuals 
leaving wills up. On the other hand, institutional factors could have an opposite effect: as seen before 
these shares trended up in Wales, but went down in England (figure 1). 
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Figure 3: Notional occupational and wealth distribution 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how the partial coverage of the probate record might lead to under and over 
representation of different sectors if wealth or capital are unequally distributed. It reports four stylized 
occupational categories: services which is on average wealthier; industry which is concentrated among the 
poor; and a richer and poorer part of agriculture (yeomen and husbandmen). For simplicity, we assume 
that probate is entirely determined by wealth. If probate only captured those with wealth above point A, 
then the share in services would be much greater than in industry, and agriculture would be dominated by 
yeomen. If probate included the much larger share of the population with wealth above point B, then the 
share in industry would be much larger (although still under-estimated) as would the share in agriculture 
from husbandmen. Moreover, if the share of deaths generating a probate record declined over time from 
B to A, then the occupational composition would appear to change, with a shift out of industry and into 
services. This would be entirely an artefact of sample composition.  
It is difficult to tell a priori whether the representation of industry or agriculture will be distorted more as 
a result of this selection bias, but it is reasonable to assume broadly stationary and homogenous effects. 
Wallis, Colson & Chilosi, ‘Puncturing the Malthus Delusion’. 10 
 
Clark et al (2012: 374) find that probates were generated roughly in proportion to the population in rural 
and urban areas: they only ‘modestly oversample’ rural areas because farming was capital intensive. 
Animals made up a large share of the agricultural capital stock and livestock intensity in farming remained 
roughly stable in early modern England (Allen 2005: 8; Broadberry 2013: 11). Implements, the other main 
capital component of pre-modern farming, appear to have increased significantly in importance only after 
1750 (Allen 2004: 109, 2005: 8). Certainly, there were big differences in the structure of land-ownership 
across England (Shaw-Taylor 2012). Yet, while family farming employed fewer labourers, it was also less 
capital intensive and therefore less productive than capitalist farming. As for industry, it continued to be 
labour-intensive for most of the period under analysis: until the industrial revolution it mainly relied on 
hand tools and human energy (Broadberry et al 2015: 366).  
There are some signs of changes in relative productivity that might undermine this assumption. In Clark’s 
wage data, building workers’ incomes start to pull away from the 1620s, and from the 1680s masons 
consistently earn around a fifth more than agricultural labourers. In Allen’s wage data, the early 
seventeenth century is a period of relative prosperity for agricultural workers, and it is not until the 1680s 
that their earnings fall below those of building labourers. However, it is hard to imagine that a twenty 
percent shift in incomes, even if this mapped over onto the workforce more generally, would have a very 
large effect on the relative distributions of wealth and capital at death. Moreover, the extent to which 
these wages mirror incomes in other occupations within each sector is an open question. According to 
Broadberry et al’s (2015: 365-7) figures between 1522 and 1801 industry’s productivity growth was about 
the same as in services and lower than in agriculture. It is only in the nineteenth century that differences 
in the rates of growth across sectors grew large.  
To put this in another way, probate records allow us to see just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. And as 
we all know, the form of the iceberg that we see tells us nothing about the shape of the part that lurks out 
of sight. Maybe so. But because we do know the total volume of the occupational iceberg, then we can 
infer something about how sectoral shares in the part ‘under the waterline’ would need to be changing if 
the overall sectoral distribution was to remain stable. What is more, because we view many different 
occupational icebergs across decades and counties, each floating at different levels, we can form 
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expectations about their overall shape. This strategy is pursued in section 5, where we econometrically 
estimate the effect of the share of deaths with a probate record on county-level occupational structures to 
construct counterfactual series, under the assumption that all male deaths were recorded. In other words, 
we exploit how variations in the extent to which the icebergs are visible match with variations in their 
visible shapes in order to figure out what the invisible parts look like. In this regard, it is important to 
remember that the situation is actually not as extreme as the iceberg metaphor implies: the poor are 
under-represented in probate, not invisible. 7 
By doing so, we only address the most obvious source of bias. There are other issues. Because death is 
more common among older adults, probate records are a poor source for occupations concentrated 
among the young. So domestic service, servants in husbandry and apprentices are all under-represented. 
So too, we might expect, are soldiers and sailors. Moreover, because probate records tend to report a 
single occupation, they fail to report by-employments. They may also under-report marginal, low status or 
illegal work: thieves, dung collectors and hangmen could, one might imagine, go to the grave under a 
more palatable job title.  
Yet, the impact of these biases is likely to be relatively mild.  There is no reason to believe that the 
sectoral distribution of workers’ early years of employment changed sufficiently to affect trends over this 
period. Agriculture and industry both consistently employed large numbers of young workers (Kussmaul 
1981; Minns & Wallis 2012; Field 2013). Neither is known to have experienced any kind of institutional 
or technological shock before the creation of the youth-dependent textile factories of the later eighteenth 
century (Honeyman 2007) that might substantially shift the age-structure of the workforce in a particular 
sector in a way that would bias trends from probate.  
Soldiers and sailors do appear in our probate data, although they only exceed one percent of the sample 
for a few years during the seven years’ war (1754-1763). Even then, a short period of high war-related 
mortality among the military largely disappears in longer-term averages. By contrast, estimates of 
mustered naval manpower equal roughly 3 – 5 percent of the English adult male population in the first 
                                                          
7
 Sebastien Keibek is currently working on an alternative approach to identifying levels from probate data for 
his Cambridge PhD thesis. 
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half of the eighteenth century (Rodgers 2004: 636-7).8 Most would appear in probate under whatever 
occupation they entered after leaving the army or navy. Mariners are a particular difficulty, as deaths at sea 
are often not assigned to a county in the probate record and so fall outside our sample. Nonetheless, our 
probate dataset does show a substantial increase in the share of the male workforce identified as mariners. 
They rise from around one percent of the male workforce in our sample in the early seventeenth century 
to four to five percent by the start of the eighteenth century. 9 The major occupations where we would 
expect under-representation to be an issue are concentrated in the service sector and it seems possible, 
even likely, that some of the growth in the size of Britain’s military establishment, navy and merchant 
marine fleet are underplayed in our data. Aside from short periods of intense conflict, notably in the civil 
wars and Napoleonic wars, the impact is likely to be modest, however. 
The objection that probates fail to recognise by-employments has been considered by a number of 
researchers. Recently, Keibek and Shaw-Taylor (2013) have shown for a sample of inventories, that the 
scale of by-employment has often been exaggerated. As important is the point Clark et al (2012) made 
that there is no reason to believe that by employment is biased towards one sector or another (so, for 
example, farmers were much more likely to have a by-employment in industry than weavers are to have in 
agriculture), or for that matter that the structure of by-employment changed over time in a way that 
would affect the validity of our trends.  
  
                                                          
8
 Rogers provides annual totals for naval manpower, compared here against the English adult male population; 
the actual share would be lower if we knew the share recruited from outside England. 
9
 In the full probate dataset of males with occupations from all locations (as many military and mariners are 
not identified with a country or county), just over 1 percent of deaths were in the army or navy from the 1740s 
onwards. Sailors are assigned to the navy where the ship is identified as naval; otherwise they are treated as 
merchant mariners. The naval share may be understated as a result, but as both categories fall into services 
there is no net effect.  Mariners make up over ten percent of the workforce in some periods in the eighteenth 
century without restricting by jurisdiction, country or county, but this may be an overstatement as the PCC has 
a particular role for deaths (such as those at sea) that occur outside of other probate jurisdictions 
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APPRENTICES 
 
While probate data has been used intensively for decades, apprenticeship records have not previously 
been used as a source on occupational structure. Their pitfalls and potential biases are many, but they can 
offer a useful independent alternative to probate. 
Apprenticeship records offer us a viable source for adult occupations in England because of the 
enthusiastic way in which families across the country sent children, mainly but not always sons, to learn a 
trade in London (Minns & Wallis 2012). Our estimates suggest that in the order of one in ten teenage 
boys would make the journey to the metropolis by the late seventeenth century; the details of their 
contract would then be entered in the records of one of the city’s guilds. One of the pieces of information 
that would usually be recorded was the occupation or status of their father; another was the place where 
the apprentice was from: the location of their family home. It is these two pieces of information that we 
use here. Mothers do appear, but unfortunately they are far fewer in number and are all too often simply 
described as widow. 
The dataset we explore here includes apprenticeship records from a broad sample of London guilds. 
Thanks to the extraordinary industry and generosity of a few genealogists, particularly Cliff Webb, we 
have the records of just over 430,000 apprenticeships in London between 1550 and 1799.10 Not all 
records contain a note of the father’s place, and some apprentices came from Scotland, Ireland or the 
colonies.  
There are some limits to the apprentice dataset. Before the 1590s and after the 1760s, we have too few 
observations for the sample to be particularly useful. Because a handful of remote English counties only 
sent a small number of apprentices, we restrict our sample to counties with more than ten apprentices 
each year for whom we are able to code their father’s occupation as within agriculture, industry or 
services, giving us a minimum of 100 observations per decade. This avoids problematically small samples. 
                                                          
10
 The majority of the dataset is described in Leunig, Minns & Wallis (2011). Additional material for the 
Merchant Taylors has been supplied by Michael Scott. Material for several other guilds is taken from the 
Records of London Livery Companies Online database (www.rollco.org), kindly supplied by the Centre for 
Metropolitan History. 
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Cornwall, Durham, Northumberland and Rutland fall out of the sample for most periods as a result, as 
do all Welsh counties, and we have only a few county-level observations outside the seventeenth century. 
We exclude the period after 1759, as there are fewer than ten counties meeting this criteria after that 
point.  
Once these are excluded, our sample contains 304,430 apprentices known to be from England. Of these, 
we can identify the occupation and county for the fathers of 290,958 youths. For the seventeenth century, 
our detailed sample includes four to five percent of English teenage males and, most importantly, their 
fathers.11 
  
                                                          
11
 The share of teenage males was calculated from Wrigley & Schofield’s 1981 population and age structure 
estimates. 
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Table 2: The Apprentices’ Fathers Dataset 
Period Observations Guilds Counties 
 N N N 
1590 4,361 16 22 
1600 10,764 23 32 
1610 17,507 26 35 
1620 16,416 31 34 
1630 21,405 35 34 
1640 21,115 38 34 
1650 27,162 42 34 
1660 23,209 50 32 
1670 22,727 55 34 
1680 24,021 56 33 
1690 22,493 62 30 
1700 21,058 63 28 
1710 17,576 65 24 
1720 13,318 65 18 
1730 10,694 64 13 
1740 8,798 63 12 
1750 8,334 63 11 
    
Total 290,958   
Source: see text.  
Note: The table reports a count of apprentice records where we have information on the place and occupation of 
the apprentice’s father, and the number of guilds and counties in our analysis for each decade. 
 
What are the limitations of this sample of fathers of London apprentices? A number leap out. Once again, 
we only learn about male occupations, as the information on mothers is too limited to use. Obviously, we 
would also expect that lifecycle occupations concentrated among the young will largely be missing. There 
is a wealth bias here, just as in probate. These are fathers who can afford to invest in their children’s 
human capital. The cost of travel, clothing, and any fee (known as the ‘premium’) paid to the master 
mean that the poor are no doubt underrepresented (although some of the youths were partly funded by 
charity) (Minns and Wallis 2013). Given that these costs would be higher for youths coming from further 
afield, we might expect that the size of any wealth bias is greater for distant counties. Even more simply, 
these fathers were males who were able to establish and sustain families. Given that the number of 
surviving children was positively correlated with wealth (Clark and Hamilton 2006), is a further source of 
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bias towards more prosperous occupations (and some will be observed more than once, if they send 
several children to the city).  We might also expect that the children of men working in industry or 
services are more likely to choose an apprenticeship in the first place. They have direct experience of this 
kind of work. They may have connections or resources through their family that could support them in 
the future.  
 
If we compare these biases with those in the probate sample, it is obvious that several overlap. It would 
make little sense to suggest that the apprentices’ fathers offer us a better way to generate a direct estimate 
of the occupational structure. Given that there is a resource barrier, we would expect that any changes in 
relative income and wealth inequality may all affect the internal validity of our estimates over time.  The 
age composition of the sample, and the effects of occupational simplification (excluding by-employment 
etc) on coverage, both rear their heads as problems here, too.  
The dataset of apprentices’ fathers has two advantages, however. First, while there is a wealth bias there is 
no reason to anticipate any capital bias here: in fact, we would expect that there is a bias against 
agricultural families. Second, there is some reason to believe that our sample is drawn from a wider cross 
section of English society than is true for probate. While some of London’s apprentices are drawn from 
the nation’s rich, seeking lucrative careers as merchants and wholesalers, others would were training to 
become shoemakers, tailors and smiths. In the early eighteenth century, when we have systematic data on 
the amounts apprentices’ families paid to masters, and the share who paid, between a third and a half of 
London apprentices paid no fee at all and many paid below ten pounds (Minns & Wallis 2013). Labourers 
are still rare though.  
 
METHODS 
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For this analysis, we allocate individuals to agriculture if their occupation is coded as farming or fishing in 
Wrigley’s PST system. Occupations coded by PST into the secondary sector are grouped under industry. 
Mining is allocated to industry, although it is in the primary sector in the original PST structure. Our 
services category contains all retailing, distribution and service sector occupations. Our agriculture 
category differs slightly from that used by Clark et al, but matches that employed by Broadberry et al and 
Shaw-Taylor.12 We restrict our analysis to male testators. Like Clark, we allocate labourers to agriculture if 
they are located outside towns (defined using Langton’s (2000) list).13 
To amalgamate the individual county series of probate records into national indices for agriculture, 
industry and services we need to take into account three aspects of our data: the different sizes of 
counties in our sample; the absence of London; and the age-structure of the sampled population. To 
address the first issue, we weight our county sectoral data using a set of county population estimates 
interpolated between Wrigley’s benchmark estimates from 1600 onwards, and projected back in line with 
national population trends before 1600. The weights adjust as relative county population shares shift over 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (although not before 1600) to reflect changes in the distribution of 
England’s population.14 For Wales, we interpolate linearly between Owen’s county populations (Owen 
1959) 
The second issue needs a moment of explanation. London’s growing share of the English population has 
a meaningful impact on the share of the workforce active outside of farming and fishing. The growth of 
London is one of the most dramatic developments in the English economy in this period. London 
exploded from around 80,000 inhabitants to around 400,000 between 1550 and 1650. In 1550, the 
                                                          
12
 Several of the occupations Clark et al identify as farming and fishing are placed in other sectors under the 
PST system (farrier, dredger, seedsman, hop dealer, hayman, drover, groom, veterinary surgeon). One, 
scavelman, is uncategorised.  We have tested Clark’s categorisation and the results are not meaningfully 
different. 
13
 The effect of which technique we choose to allocate labourers between sectors is relatively trivial here. 
Labourers only appear in small numbers. Overall, labourers supply 3.2 percent of male probates: the highest 
share is 5.6 percent of male probates in 1610-19. We have experimented with labourers excluded or allocated 
according to Broadberry et al’s approach. The results are not meaningfully different. 
14
 We have also explored using the constant set of population weights (based on figures for houses per county 
in 1689) that Clark et al used. They have no meaningful impact on our results. 
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metropolis contained 2.6 percent of England’s population; a century later it held 7.5 percent.15 Growth in 
England’s other large towns meant that they also now held 0.77 percent more of the population. Almost 
6 percent of the population had shifted to large urban locations where they were highly unlikely to be 
working in farming or fishing. Even if the share of the workforce in agriculture in rural England was 
constant, the shift of population into large cities would mean that the national average had declined.  
To take London’s growth into account in our national estimates, we calculate a weighted average of the 
non-London and London sectoral shares. Our population-weighted county probate series is the source 
for the non-London sectoral shares. Our sectoral shares for London are based on estimates from the 
partial probate data for Middlesex, which shows that around a third of the city’s population was in 
industry and two-thirds in services.16 The population estimates for London that we use in the weighted 
averages are linear interpolations between benchmark figures that Wrigley produced for half century 
intervals between 1550 and 1750 (Wrigley 1985).17 Obviously, no adjustment is made to the Welsh data 
on this account. 
Finally, we adjust for the age structure of our data. We do this here simply by advancing our series by two 
decades, so that, for example our estimate for 1620 is taken as representing the farm share in 1600. Our 
series should then represent the sectoral share of the averagely-aged worker. 
We apply the same general approach to the apprentices’ fathers dataset, weighting it by population and 
adjusting for age structure.18 However, as Middlesex forms a very large part of the data, we do not need 
to adjust for London. 
 
                                                          
15
 We Wrigley’s estimates for the broad London population (Wrigley 1967; Harding 1990). For other cities we 
use De Vries 1984 and Langdon 200X. National population estimates are from Wrigley et al 1997. 
16
 For simplicity, we fix the results at this level. Middlesex includes some agricultural land, but we concentrate 
on the London city area and exclude farming. Estimates of London’s manufacturing share are similar: 
Alexander estimated 33 percent for the 1690s; Beier suggested 40 percent for the 1601-1700; Schwarz 
identifes a third for 1851(Alexander 1989: 54; Beier 1986: 150-151; Schwarz 1992: 23). 
17
 If we apply the same correction to Clark et al’s results, then their stable non-London farm share would 
conceal a gentle downward trend in the national average. Assuming the national farm share outside London 
was the same as they find for 1652-1660, then the national farm share declines from 0.64 in c. 1550 to 0.61 in 
1650 and 0.59 in 1700 as London grows. 
18
 The mean age of London apprentices’ fathers when their son was bound was 52 (n=52), based on a sample 
of apprentice records linked to Family Reconstitution data (for the source, see Klemp et al 2013). 
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BASELINE RESULTS 
 
A good introduction to the main results from our probate dataset are given in figure 4 which reports the 
average of the share of males in agriculture in twenty English counties at twenty year intervals between 
1540 and 1799. The figure reports those series for which our data covers more than a decade or two. 
Recall that we are primarily interested in the trend, not the absolute level, given the problems with bias 
discussed above. As can be seen, in most counties the share was not stable. A downward trend after 
c.1600 is visible in most counties. Three counties in the northernmost parts of England - Cumberland, 
Northumberland and Westmoreland – have more stable shares in agriculture. Nonetheless, the initial 
impression is that Clark et al’s finding of stability in farming and fishing was mistaken. 
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Figure 4: Share of males working in agriculture by county from probate dataset, England and Wales 
A. England 
 
B.  Wales 
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In table 3, we report indices for the share of the workforce in agriculture, industry and services for 
England and Wales. These are population weighted, and adjusted for London and age structure as 
discussed earlier. We report two estimates. The first includes all counties that meet our criteria for each 
decade, allowing the composition to shift over time. The second holds the counties in the sample 
constant For England, we find a broadly stable share of the workforce in farming and fishing in the 
sixteenth century, followed by a clear and persistent move out of agriculture from the start of the 
seventeenth century onwards. The impact of this movement on the overall share in agriculture was 
relatively modest in the early seventeenth century, with the farming share c. 1650 only around ten percent 
lower than at the close of the sixteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century, the share of the 
workforce in agriculture had fallen by a quarter. The share of the workforce in industry had grown by 
around a third, while the share in services had roughly doubled. 
In Wales, we see much less evidence of substantial structural change. The share in agriculture in the early 
eighteenth century was only ten to twenty percent below that seen in the late sixteenth century.  The share 
of the workforce in services had risen by perhaps 10 percent. Industry had grown, but if 1580 or 1620 
were the base years, then the size of industrial expansion would also be relatively small. The estimates are 
based on smaller numbers and so are more volatile and less precise, particularly for the late sixteenth 
century. Still, they give an impression of a relatively unchanging Welsh economy. This conclusion fits well 
with the impression in the literature that, despite growing prosperity among some farmers (Jenkins, 1987: 
270-275; Powell, 2007), secondary and even mining activity was slow to develop in Wales. Williams 
suggests that as late as 1700, mining and industry were ‘far more like they had been in 1400 than what 
they would be in 1850’  (Williams, 1993: 56,395).  
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Table 3: Sectoral distribution of the labour force from probate dataset 
England 
 Share Index Index 
Sample: Stable Stable Variable 
 
Ag. Ind. Serv. Ag. Ind. Serv. Ag. Ind. Serv. 
1540-59 0.65 0.21 0.14 101 93 108 101 89 115 
1560-79 0.64 0.22 0.14 99 96 112 101 93 105 
1580-99 0.67 0.22 0.11 103 97 88 104 95 88 
1600-19 0.65 0.23 0.13 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1620-39 0.61 0.24 0.15 95 105 119 95 103 123 
1640-59 0.59 0.25 0.16 91 112 127 89 113 132 
1660-79 0.51 0.28 0.2 79 125 162 79 128 163 
1680-99 0.47 0.29 0.24 72 127 194 72 130 196 
1700-19 0.51 0.27 0.22 79 121 171 76 126 179 
1720-39 0.42 0.31 0.27 65 137 213 63 141 221 
1740-59 0.42 0.3 0.27 65 134 218 64 139 221 
1760-79 0.39 0.29 0.32 60 128 256 59 134 255 
          
Wales 
 
Share Index Index 
Sample: Stable Stable Variable 
 
Ag. Ind. Serv. Ag. Ind. Serv. Ag. Ind. Serv. 
1560-79 0.79 0.15 0.06 99 175 52 99 175 52 
1580-99 0.74 0.12 0.14 93 137 124 93 137 124 
1600-19 0.8 0.08 0.11 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1620-39 0.73 0.14 0.14 91 161 120 91 156 124 
1640-59 0.71 0.16 0.13 89 188 113 89 191 110 
1660-79 0.72 0.15 0.13 90 175 112 91 173 109 
1680-99 0.74 0.13 0.13 92 153 115 93 153 113 
1700-19 0.72 0.15 0.13 90 178 114 90 176 110 
1720-39 0.64 0.16 0.19 80 194 167 81 197 161 
1740-59 0.67 0.16 0.17 84 193 145 84 194 140 
1760-79 0.72 0.14 0.13 90 170 117 90 172 115 
 
It is worth pausing a second to ask why our results are markedly different to those that Clark et al derive 
from their analysis of probate data (2012). It is important to emphasise that our raw statistics on the share 
of the workforce in agriculture by county are basically the same, with only small differences due to data 
collection and coding.  The difference in the final results has two main causes. The first is the London 
and age adjustments we implement to correct the dataset. In particular, Clark et al’s second data point (for 
the 1650s) is, in our analysis, pushed back to the 1630s, when the change in the agricultural share is only 
just becoming visible. Because Clark et al’s point estimate is for one of the last decades in which the farm 
Wallis, Colson & Chilosi, ‘Puncturing the Malthus Delusion’. 23 
 
share remained as high, they miss the decline. The second is the timing and scope of our samples. Clark et 
al’s first dataset for the 1560s covers a period when the share of workers in agriculture in the probate 
record is rising in a number of counties (visible in figure 4). This is likely to be a mechanical effect of 
improvements to record keeping; we exclude some of the counties Clark et al use as the share of probate 
records with data is too low. By 1600, the quality of the probate record has improved markedly – and 
from them onwards it remains good, even as the share of the workforce in agriculture that it reveals 
begins to decline in most of England.  
What does our dataset of apprentices’ fathers suggest about the occupational structure of England in this 
period? In figure 5, we report the share in of male workers in agriculture by county. Taken at a county 
level, the trends are similar to those seen in the probate data shown in figure 4. A decline in the share in 
agriculture is widespread. Both Cumberland and Westmorland are relatively stable, as they are in the 
probate results.  
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Figure 5: Share of males working in agriculture by county from apprentice dataset, England  
 
 
 
 
Converted into national indices, the results are broadly similar to those we found using the probate 
dataset. Agriculture declines from the end of sixteenth century, with the fall becoming much more 
marked from the middle of the seventeenth century. Industry and Services both grow at a roughly similar 
rate. Compared to the probate data, the share of the workforce in agriculture declines faster when 
measured with the apprentice data. The expansion in industry moves in a quite similar way, although it is 
more sustained in the later seventeenth century. The growth in services is less rapid than in the probate 
dataset, where it expands dramatically.  
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Table 4: Sectoral distribution of the labour force from apprentices’ dataset 
 
Level, Adjusted Index 
 
Ag. Ind. Serv. Ag. Ind. Serv. 
1580-99 0.58 0.28 0.14 115 87 81 
1600-19 0.5 0.32 0.18 100 100 100 
1620-39 0.45 0.33 0.22 90 103 124 
1640-59 0.43 0.34 0.23 85 107 131 
1660-79 0.35 0.4 0.25 69 127 140 
1680-99 0.33 0.45 0.23 65 140 128 
1700-19 0.25 0.47 0.28 50 147 159 
1720-39 0.2 0.54 0.26 40 169 146 
 
The estimates of sectoral composition generated by both our datasets are quite similar. We would not 
expect them to match exactly. The apprentices’ father dataset covers a larger spread of counties, and, as 
we anticipated, contains a higher share from industry and, particularly, services than the probate data. For 
some counties, we have data from both datasets, which allows us to consider how well their estimates 
agree.  
Figure 6 gives a scatter plot of the share of workforce in agriculture for those counties for which we have 
more than four observations between 1600 and 1700 (out of a maximum of six twenty-year averages). As 
it shows, for most counties the probate and apprentices’ father data agree reasonably closely on the share 
of the male workforce in agriculture; the correlation coefficient is 0.82. For industry and services the 
correlations are somewhat weaker: 0.601 for services and 0.766 for industry.  We suspect the lower 
correlation for industry and services is a product both of the difference in bias in the dataset and the 
smaller size of the raw shares of each sample in these sectors increasing the margin of error around each 
observation. For our main sector of interest, agriculture, our datasets agree with each other reassuringly 
well. 
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Figure 6: Share of Male Workforce in Agriculture: Apprentice and Probate Datasets Compared 
 
 
Note: the figure reports the share of the male workforce in agriculture for counties where more than four 
observations are available from both datasets between 1600-19 and 1700-19. 
How do our results fit with the various estimates from other sources that exist in the literature? The 
existing estimates before the mid eighteenth century only apply to England so we exclude Wales from our 
discussion. In figures 7 and 8, we explore what happens if we tie our probate and apprentice index to 
each of the three main estimates in the literature for the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. We 
also show the position of the two estimates from the muster rolls for 1522, and Broadberry et al’s 
estimate for 1759 from Massie. We treat Clark et al’s 1653-60 estimate as reflecting the 1620-39 
occupational structure, to address the age profile of the probate sample it contains. We locate Broadberry 
et al’s estimate from King’s 1688 work at 1680-99. And we position Shaw Taylor and Wrigley’s estimate 
for 1710 at 1700-19.  
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Figure 7: Sectoral Distribution over Time, Probate Indices
 
Note: The figure reports sectoral trends for England estimated by linking the indices derived from the probate 
register, stable sample of counties, to three existing benchmarks. The lines labelled “B” are tied to the 1688/1700 
estimate from King’s social table in Broadberry et al 2015: 350. Lines labelled “ST” are tied to the 1710 estimate 
from baptismal registers in Shaw-Taylor & Wrigley 2014: 59. The line labelled “C” is tied to the weighted 1653-60 
estimate of agricultural share from probate data in Clark et al 2012: 378. Additional point estimates for male 
employment are also reported for the 1522 Muster list from Broadberry et al 2015: 353 (labelled “B”), and Clark 
2013: 9 (labelled “C”); for 1560-79 from Clark et al 2012: 381 (labelled “C”); and for c.1750 from Massie in 
Broadberry et al 2015: 356 (labelled “M”). 
The result of linking our probate indices to the existing estimates is clear. On this measure, there is 
essentially no historically meaningful conflict between the Clark et al’s and the Broadberry et al’s estimates 
of the agricultural share. Both fit on the same trend line. The differences between the series we construct 
by linking our index to their estimates are in the order of one or two percentage points in any one decade 
(see Appendix 1). The lines fit well with estimates for the early sixteenth century, neatly bisecting the two 
figures that have been calculated from the Muster Rolls. They also match tidily with Broadberry et al’s 
reinterpretation of Massie’s figures. The series tied to Shaw Taylor and Wrigley’s estimate overlaps almost 
exactly with the series tied to Broadberry et al. This is a more artificial coherence, generated by an 
inexplicable bump in the probate series in 1700-19. If we smoothed the indices, then the series tied to 
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Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley would be at a somewhat higher level. The gap would not be large, however. Of 
course, in this form our indices offer no resolution to the quite different estimates of the industrial and 
services shares produced by Broadberry et al and Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley. 
Figure 8: Sectoral Distribution over Time, Apprentices’ Father Indices 
 
Note: The figure reports sectoral trends for England estimated by linking the indices derived from the probate 
register, stable sample of counties, to three existing benchmarks. The lines labelled “B” are tied to the 1688/1700 
estimate from King’s social table in Broadberry et al 2015: 350. Lines labelled “ST” are tied to the 1710 estimate 
from baptismal registers in Shaw-Taylor & Wrigley 2014: 59. The line labelled “C” is tied to the weighted 1653-60 
estimate of agricultural share from probate data in Clark et al 2012: 378. Additional point estimates for male 
employment are also reported for the 1522 Muster list from Broadberry et al 2015: 353 (labelled “B”), and Clark 
2013: 9 (labelled “C”); for 1560-79 from Clark et al 2012: 381 (labelled “C”); and for c.1750 from Massie in 
Broadberry et al 2015: 356 (labelled “M”). 
By comparison, the index we constructed from the apprenticeship data generates too steep a decline in 
the share of workers in agriculture to be plausible as a long-term series; it fails to capture the more stable 
share in the sixteenth century and the relative slowing of the movement out of agriculture in the 
eighteenth century. The extreme heights reached by estimate linked to the Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley 
figure is likely a reflection of the weakening of this series by the first third of the eighteenth century. 
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Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the probate series is likely to have been much closer to 
the distribution of occupations in the population as a whole. The apprenticeship series provides an 
independent confirmation that the trends in the probate series are moving in a plausible way, but it is not 
as good a guide to sectoral change in its own right. 
 
COUNTERFACTUAL ESTIMATES 
 
In this simple form, the evidence of both datasets agrees that England experienced a substantial 
movement out of agriculture in the seventeenth century. Yet, as we stressed above, partial coverage in the 
probate records implies that changes in the shares of the deaths covered could significantly affect trends. 
We therefore econometrically estimate the effect of changes in these shares and use the results to examine 
how the series might look like if all the deaths were recorded. This is a strong robustness check for the 
indices just presented, as it estimates them keeping constant the share of deaths recorded across space 
and time. However, as with all out of sample predictions, it should be taken as a best guess for the levels.  
To estimate how occupational shares respond to changes in coverage we rely on the generalised linear 
model developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), which is designed to fit proportional data, such as 
sectoral shares: the predicted values are bounded between 0 and 1 and the marginal effects flatten at the 
margins. The marginal effects are also decreasing with the independent variable, so that they are lower for 
a high share of deaths than for a low one. Differences in levels are expected across counties depending on 
their specialisation. Figure 4 highlights differences and non-linearity in the county trends. We therefore 
include county dummies and county specific quadratic trends as independent variables together with the 
share of deaths recorded. As the marginal effects, by definition, cancel themselves out across sectors they 
are constrained to sum up to zero, both for the share of the wills and time. These constraints hold exactly 
at the sample mean of the independent variable, which by definition is one third, and approximately for 
other values. They ensure that the sum of the fitted values across the three sectors is close to one for all 
counties and time. The counterfactual sectoral shares are then computed with the predicted values under 
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the assumption of universal male coverage for the wills plus the errors.19 Finally, the aggregation across 
counties follows the same method used for the observed sectoral shares.20 
The relevant coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.21 
Their sizes, 0.30 for agriculture, 0.41 for industry and -0.71 for services are consistent with expectations: 
an increase in the shares of deaths covered increases the shares of industrial and agricultural workers by 
about the same amount at the expense of the share in services. Specifically, these coefficients mean that 
on average an increase by 1 percentage points in the share of deaths covered increases the shares of 
agriculture and industry by 0.050 percentage points and 0.068 percentage points respectively, which is 
plausible. Figure 9 shows the results alongside previous estimates for England. 
Figure 9: Sectoral Distribution over Time in England, Counterfactual Probate Estimates 
 
                                                          
19
 On average the absolute difference between the sums of the fitted values by county and decade and one is 
less than one percentage point. However, the counterfactual sectoral shares tend to slightly over-predict their 
sizes: on average by a total of about five percentage points. The counterfactual labour shares are therefore 
scaled to sum up to one for each county and decade before they are aggregated. 
20
 However, to exploit variation the econometric analysis is carried out on 10-years rather than 20-years 
means. There are 1800 observations; the coefficient of variation of the sectoral shares is 72 per cent (range: 0 
to 88 per cent) and that of the share of deaths recorded is 40 per cent (range: 10 to 56 per cent). 
21
 This applies to almost all of the controls as well. Standard errors clustered by sector allow for arbitrary 
within sector correlation. 
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Note: The figure reports counterfactual sectoral trends for England estimated assuming that all male deaths were 
included in the probate records of the counties in our sample. The lines labelled “unbal.” use all available data. The 
lines labelled “bal.” uses a constant sample of counties for which we have data in all decades. The point estimates 
labelled “B” are from Broadberry et al 2015: 350, 353, 356 (the last estimate, from 1759, refers to the UK, rather 
than England). The point estimates labelled “C” are from Clark et al 2012: 378, 381 and Clark 2013: 9. The point 
estimates labelled “ST” are from Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley 2014: 59 and they refer to England and Wales. “Ag.” 
stands for agriculture, “Ind.” stands for industry and “Serv.” stands for services. 
As with our baseline results, the unbalanced and the balanced sample agree, both on trends and levels. 
Clearly the counterfactual estimates strongly corroborate the results from the un-adjusted series: 
agricultural shares went down, while both industry and services went up; the decline of agriculture was 
slow between the later sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries and became rapid from then until the 
early eighteenth century.  
Reassuringly, there is a very close match with previous estimates. Indeed, across the three sectors, there is 
a strikingly close match with Broadberry’s et al’s  estimates. Clark et al’s agricultural shares are 
significantly different from ours only at the beginning of the period. Thus, in the 1530s our estimate is 
closer to Broadberry et al’s revised estimate from the Muster list than to Clark et al’s. Clark et al’s figure 
for 1560-79, which is based on un-adjusted probate records at a time when the quality of record-keeping 
was low, seems to under-estimate the agricultural share. Unless this rose in first half of the sixteenth 
century, which is unlikely, our figures are more plausible. Our estimate of the share of services for the 
1710s is higher than Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley’s. This is only partly due to their inclusion of Wales: if we 
also include Wales then the difference goes down from 7.2 to 6.2 percentage points.22 Their estimate of 
12 percent appears low; given levels of urbanization and the numbers likely employed in catering to the 
needs of the gentry, we might expect services to be higher overall. Our estimates for services in the 
eighteenth century are in line with, albeit somewhat lower than, those of Broadberry et al.  Caution is in 
order, not least because after 1700, as said before, it is likely that our sample become less representative of 
England. Yet, all in all, our estimates ring true.  
Figure 10: Sectoral Distribution over Time in Wales, Counterfactual Probate Estimates 
                                                          
22
 Computation based on the unbalanced sample assuming that the population of Wales was equal to 6.6 
percent of that of England and Wales, as in the 1801 census. The difference is smaller for the balanced sample. 
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Note: The figure reports counterfactual sectoral trends for Wales estimated assuming that all male deaths were 
included in the probate records of the counties in our sample. The lines coded “unbal.” use all available data. The 
lines coded “bal.” uses a constant sample of counties for which we have data in all the decades. 
There is very little difference between the unbalanced and balanced samples in Wales, too (figure 10). As 
with the unadjusted series, we find much less evidence of structural change there: we only detect a 
comparatively slight fall in the agricultural share between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. 
Our sectoral shares estimate can be used to construct time series of indexed trends in output per worker, 
using Broadberry et al’s (2015: 364-369) method together with their data on female sectoral shares, 
sectoral output and population.23 Figure 11 shows the results. 
  
                                                          
23
 For reasons of space we only present the results of the balanced sample. Given that the sectoral shares 
estimated with the unbalanced sample are very similar so are the trends in labour productivity. Since  
Broadberry et do not provide separate sectoral output figures for England, we have to assume that in the 
eighteenth century the English GDP per capita grew at the same rate as that of the UK. 
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Figure 11: Indexed trends in output per worker in England (1700-09=100) 
 
All three sectors experienced rapid rises in labour productivity between the 1630s and the beginning of 
the eighteenth century - essentially the same time period over which structural transformation became 
rapid. It therefore makes sense to break down the 1522-1700 period analysed by Broadberry et al into two 
parts. One before 1630, and one running from then until the first decade of the eighteenth century. Table 
5 reports the yearly rates of growth in labour productivity in these two periods. 
Table 5: Yearly rates of growth in labour productivity in England (in percentage) 
 
Beta*100 
 1530s-1620s 1630s-1700s 
Agriculture 0.076 0.679*** 
Industry -0.304** 0.904*** 
Services 0.028 0.463*** 
Total -0.021 0.755*** 
Note: Beta is the yearly rate of growth; ***=significant at  the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level 
and *=significant at the 1 percent level 
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Broadberry et al find that between 1522 and 1700 labour productivity growth was twice faster in 
agriculture and service than in industry and emphasise how industry really became the backbone of 
productivity growth only during the classical period of the industrial revolution in 1759-1851, with an 
yearly rate of growth of 0.93 per cent. Our estimates instead suggest industry already had a central role in 
the English economic take-off of the mid-seventeenth century, when the rates of productivity from this 
sector were about as large as they were during the industrial revolution. The only reason behind the 
discrepancy between ours and Broadberry et al’s interpretation is that a particularly poor performance for 
industry in the preceding decades means that its subsequent rise is obscured in their periodisation.  
Our results would explain why so many Englishmen were willing to move into industry after 1630, while 
not denying the impressive gains made in agricultural productivity at the same time that made this 
structural transformation possible. By the early eighteenth century, however, growth was running into 
diminishing return and both productivity growth and structural transformation slowed down. Not until 
the first of half of the nineteenth century did the English economy see again rates of productivity growth 
as fast as those of the 1630s-1700s (Broadberry et al 2015: 367).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have presented a set of new estimates for the share of the male workforce in agriculture, 
industry and services in England and Wales. Both the probate and apprentice series show substantial 
declines in the share of the workforce in agriculture in England during the seventeenth century.  
When we use these data to construct indices of sectoral shares in England over the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, we find they are consistent with the point estimates of sectoral distribution that 
other historians have generated using (mainly) different sources. Although the sources that we use here 
are affected by a number of serious limitations, this exercise in triangulation indicates that they offer a 
reasonably good measure of trends in sectoral shares. Our econometric estimates similarly indicate that 
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the changeable share of the population captured in the probate series is not driving our results: the results 
are very close to those we generate with our baseline index linked to independent estimates.  
Finally, a simple back of the envelope calculation underlines how unlikely it is that we are mistaken in 
identifying a substantial decline in the share in agriculture in the seventeenth century. Our data contains 
around 30 to 40 percent of deceased adult males in the seventeenth century. If the overall share in 
agriculture was to remain stable, as Clark et al (2012) argued, then the share in agriculture among the 
poorer, less capital rich section of society who we do not observe would have to increase substantially. 
Assuming that the same share of observed and unobserved are in agriculture in 1600, then the share of 
the unobserved employed in agriculture would have to rise by twenty percent from .63 to .75 to keep the 
overall share in agriculture stable. To us, such a dramatic shift into agriculture seems implausible. 
As any attempt to estimate national sectoral shares from these kinds of evidence will undoubtedly leave 
some more sceptical readers unconvinced, it is useful to discuss the main implications of the paper in 
order of plausibility. First, given that we utilize a much expanded collection of the same data that Clark et 
al (2012) used to argue for a stable agricultural share in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there can 
be little doubt that our results show that their conclusions were mistaken. As such, Clark’s more general 
argument that the English economy experienced little or no meaningful growth in this period does not 
find the support from occupational distribution that he thought.  
Second, both our series agree that the seventeenth century saw a major decline in the agricultural share of 
the male workforce. Decline is visible from c. 1600 onwards, and became more rapid from around the 
middle of the century. Taken just as broad indicators of occupational trends, they thus provide strong 
evidence for the timing of this important inflection point in English structural change. Finally, if the 
reader will accept that the close fit between our series and other estimates lends confidence to the results, 
then we have a credible new set of estimates for occupational shares over this period.  
Taken in their fullest form, then, our results serve to locate the moment when a significant and 
continuous flow of labour out of agriculture and into industry and services began in England firmly at the 
start of the seventeenth century. Our figures suggest a decline in the share of the male workforce in 
agriculture in England from c. 63 percent in 1600, to c. 45 percent in 1700. The sixteenth century had 
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seen little change, by contrast. Our county level estimates (figures 4 & 5) show people leaving farming in 
most parts of England, both in the North and South. Part of this adjustment took place in the growing 
urban centres of the nation. But the share of the workforce employed in industry and services increased 
substantially in rural areas too.  
Needless to say, our results fit poorly with the argument that England was in some ways stuck in a 
stagnant, barely changing equilibrium. However, the account they give us for Wales is perhaps not too far 
from that image. Certainly, there is little sign that Wales experienced a transformation of the kind 
apparent in England, implying that British economic development was accompanied by divergence across 
the island.  
Most of England’s transition out of agriculture was complete by the end of the seventeenth century. At 
the end of the eighteenth century, the share in agriculture would have fallen a further ten percentage 
points to c. 35 percent. This timing fits well with the idea that the commercial and protoindustrial 
development that occurred before the industrial revolution – developments evidenced most visibly in the 
dramatic expansion of London from a modest city by European standards to one of the biggest centres in 
the continent - marked a transitional phase towards industrialization. Finally, these new estimates of 
sectoral shares suggest that agricultural and especially industrial productivities were rising even faster in 
the seventeenth century than  in Broadberry et al’s (2015: 367) recent work, implying that industry played 
a central role in explaining the take-off of the English economy in the seventeenth century.  
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Appendix 1: Estimates of Sectoral Share, National 
England 
 
Weighted constant  
county sample 
Broadberry 1688/1700 Shaw Taylor 1710 
Clark 
1650s 
 
Ag Ind Serv Ag Ind Serv Ag Ind Serv Ag 
1540-59 65.4 21.1 13.5 64.1 23.7 12.1 64.2 29.0 7.6 62.9 
1560-79 64.1 21.7 14.1 62.8 24.5 12.6 63.0 29.9 7.9 61.7 
1580-99 67.0 22.0 11.1 65.6 24.7 9.9 65.8 30.2 6.2 64.4 
1600-19 64.8 22.6 12.6 63.5 25.4 11.2 63.7 31.0 7.0 62.4 
1620-39 61.3 23.7 15.0 60.1 26.7 13.3 60.2 32.6 8.3 59.0 
1640-59 58.8 25.2 16.0 57.6 28.4 14.3 57.8 34.6 8.9 56.6 
1660-79 51.3 28.3 20.4 50.3 31.8 18.2 50.4 38.9 11.4 49.3 
1680-99 46.9 28.7 24.4 46.0 32.3 21.7 46.1 39.4 13.6 45.2 
1700-19 51.1 27.4 21.5 50.1 30.8 19.2 50.2 37.6 12.0 49.2 
1720-39 42.2 31.0 26.8 41.4 34.9 23.8 41.5 42.6 14.9 40.6 
1740-59 42.3 30.3 27.4 41.4 34.1 24.4 41.5 41.6 15.3 40.7 
1760-79 38.8 29.0 32.2 38.0 32.6 28.7 38.1 39.8 18.0 37.3 
 
Wales  
 
Weighted constant county sample 
 
Ag Ind Serv 
1560-79 0.79 0.15 0.06 
1580-99 0.74 0.12 0.14 
1600-19 0.8 0.08 0.11 
1620-39 0.73 0.14 0.14 
1640-59 0.71 0.16 0.13 
1660-79 0.72 0.15 0.13 
1680-99 0.74 0.13 0.13 
1700-19 0.72 0.15 0.13 
1720-39 0.64 0.16 0.19 
1740-59 0.67 0.16 0.17 
1760-79 0.72 0.14 0.13 
Note: tables report the weighted and adjusted sectoral shares we estimate from the probate dataset 
(constant county sample), and the shares when the indices are tied to the various estimates. Sources are 
discussed fully in the note to figure 7.  
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Appendix 2: Sources for Probate Data 
Bedfordshire Alan F.  Cirket, Index of Bedfordshire Probate Records 1484-1858, ed. by Joan Stuart 
and Peggy Wells, The Index Library, 105 (London: British Record Society, 
1994) 
Berkshire Berkshire Family History Society, Berkshire Probate Index, 1480-1857, 2012 
Buckinghamshire Hunt, Julian, Roger Bettridge, and Alison Toplis, eds., Probate Records of the 
Archdeaconry Court of Buckingham, 1483-1660 and of the Buckinghamshire Peculiars, 
1420-1660, The Index Library, 114 (London: British Record Society, 2001) 
Cambridgeshire Thurley, Clifford A., and Dorothea Thurley, eds., Index of the Probate Records of 
the Court of the Archdeacon of Ely, 1513-1857, The Index Library, 88 (London: 
British Record Society, 1976) 
Thurley, Clifford A., and Dorothea Thurley, Index of the Probate Records of the 
Consistory Court of Ely, 1449-1858, ed. by Rosemary Rodd and E. S. Leedham-
Green, The Index Library, 103, 106, 107 (London: British Record Society, 
1994). Dataset formerly available at http://venn.csi.cam.ac.uk/Probates/ 
[accessed 7/6/2013] (no longer available) 
 
Cheshire, 
Lancashire 
Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Chester probate records 1519-1858, 
http://archivedatabases.cheshire.gov.uk/RecordOfficeWillEPayments/search.
aspx [accessed 25/4/2016] 
 
Cumberland, 
Westmorland 
Cumbria Archive Service, CASCAT, 
http://www.archiveweb.cumbria.gov.uk/CalmView/Record.aspx?src=CalmVi
ew.Catalog&id=PROB  [accessed 25/4/2016] 
County Durham, 
Northumberland 
Durham University Library, North East Inheritance Database, 
http://familyrecords.dur.ac.uk/nei/data/simple.php [accessed 25/4/2016] 
Essex, 
Hertfordshire 
Essex Record Office, Essex Records Online, http://seax.essexcc.gov.uk/ 
[accessed 25/4/2016] 
London Metropolitan Archives, Volunteer projects - Diocese of London Consistory 
Court Wills, https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/things-to-do/london-
metropolitan-archives/about/Pages/volunteer-wills-project.aspx [accessed 
25/4/2016] 
Hampshire Hampshire Archives and Local Studies, CALM, http://calm.hants.gov.uk/ 
[accessed 25/4/2016] 
Herefordshire Cliff Webb, Index to Hereford Wills 1500-1700 (unpublished private notes, 
2008) 
Hertfordshire Crawley, Beryl, and Cliff Webb, eds., Wills at Hertford 1415-1858, Index Library, 
120 (London: British Record Society, 2007) 
Lancashire, 
Westmorland 
Lancashire Archives, LANCAT, http://www.lancashire.gov.uk/libraries-and-
archives/archives-and-record-office/search-the-archives/lancat.aspx [accessed 
25/4/2016] 
Oxfordshire Oxfordshire Wills Index 1516-1857, origins.net, 
http://www.origins.net/help/aboutNWI-oxf.aspx [accessed 28/03/2014] 
(now available via Findmypast) 
Suffolk Grimwade, M. E., W. R. Serjeant, and R. K. Serjeant, eds., Index of the Probate 
Records of the Court of the Archdeacon of Suffolk, 1444-1700, The Index Library, 90-
91 (Keele, Staffordshire: British Record Society, 1979) 
Serjeant, W. R., and M. E. Grimwade, eds., Index of the Probate Records of the Court 
of the Archdeacon of Sudbury, 1354-1700, The Index Library, 95-96 (Keele, 
Staffordshire: British Record Society, 1984) 
Norfolk Record Office, NROCAT, 
http://nrocat.norfolk.gov.uk/DServe/public/searches/nroprobate.htm 
[accessed 25/4/2016] 
Surrey Surrey & South London Will Abstracts  1470-1858, eds. origins.net and Cliff 
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Webb, http://www.origins.net/help/aboutNWI-surrwills.aspx [accessed 
23/02/2014] (now available via Findmypast) 
Wiltshire Webb, Cliff, ed., Wills at Salisbury 1464-1858, The Index Library, 122, 123, 
123A (London: British Record Society, 2009) 
 
Warwickshire Webb, Cliff, ed., Wills in the Consistory Court of Lichfield 1650-1700, The Index 
Library, 125 (London: British Record Society, 2010) 
 
Worcestershire, 
Warwickshire 
Fry, Edw Alex, ed., Calendar of Wills and Administrations in the Consistory Court of 
the Bishop of Worcester, 1451-[1652]: Also Marriage Licenses and Sequestrations Now 
Deposited in the Probate Registry at Worcester, The Index Library, 31,39 (London: 
British Record Society, 1904-1910) 
 
Wales National Library of Wales, Wills Online. https://www.llgc.org.uk/discover/nlw-
resources/wills/ [accessed 25/4/2016] 
 
(Province of 
Canterbury) 
The National Archives, ‘Prerogative Court of Canterbury Wills, 1384-1858’ 
(UK Data Service, 2004) 
<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=4816> [accessed 27 
August 2013] 
 
(Province of York) Index of Wills in the York Registry [1389-1688],  Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 
vols. 11,14,19,22,24,26,28,32,35, 49,60, 68, 89. (Worksop, 1888-1934) 
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Appendix 3: sectoral shares by county (probate). 
 
   
Actual 
 
Counterfactual 
Decade county Ag. Ind. Serv. Ag. Ind. Serv. 
1620 Anglesey 0.71 0.08 0.21 0.75 0.11 0.14 
1640 Anglesey 0.57 0.24 0.19 0.60 0.26 0.13 
1650 Anglesey 0.62 0.20 0.18 0.65 0.23 0.12 
1660 Anglesey 0.54 0.18 0.28 0.58 0.21 0.21 
1670 Anglesey 0.77 0.08 0.15 0.80 0.11 0.09 
1680 Anglesey 0.66 0.11 0.23 0.69 0.14 0.16 
1690 Anglesey 0.72 0.14 0.14 0.75 0.17 0.08 
1700 Anglesey 0.76 0.11 0.13 0.78 0.14 0.08 
1710 Anglesey 0.70 0.16 0.14 0.72 0.18 0.10 
1720 Anglesey 0.53 0.24 0.23 0.56 0.26 0.17 
1730 Anglesey 0.64 0.20 0.16 0.67 0.22 0.12 
1740 Anglesey 0.70 0.21 0.09 0.72 0.23 0.05 
1750 Anglesey 0.72 0.15 0.13 0.74 0.17 0.09 
1760 Anglesey 0.75 0.11 0.14 0.77 0.14 0.10 
1770 Anglesey 0.73 0.16 0.12 0.75 0.18 0.07 
1780 Anglesey 0.74 0.11 0.15 0.76 0.13 0.11 
1520 Bedfordshire 0.75 0.10 0.14 0.77 0.14 0.09 
1530 Bedfordshire 0.76 0.13 0.11 0.77 0.17 0.06 
1540 Bedfordshire 0.76 0.15 0.09 0.77 0.19 0.04 
1550 Bedfordshire 0.71 0.19 0.10 0.73 0.23 0.04 
1560 Bedfordshire 0.77 0.15 0.08 0.78 0.20 0.02 
1570 Bedfordshire 0.81 0.14 0.05 0.82 0.19 0.00 
1580 Bedfordshire 0.72 0.20 0.08 0.73 0.24 0.03 
1590 Bedfordshire 0.68 0.23 0.08 0.69 0.27 0.03 
1600 Bedfordshire 0.65 0.26 0.09 0.66 0.30 0.03 
1610 Bedfordshire 0.68 0.26 0.07 0.69 0.30 0.01 
1620 Bedfordshire 0.67 0.24 0.09 0.68 0.29 0.03 
1630 Bedfordshire 0.75 0.19 0.06 0.76 0.24 0.00 
1640 Bedfordshire 0.66 0.27 0.07 0.68 0.32 0.01 
1650 Bedfordshire 0.61 0.30 0.10 0.62 0.34 0.04 
1660 Bedfordshire 0.58 0.29 0.13 0.60 0.33 0.07 
1670 Bedfordshire 0.59 0.30 0.11 0.61 0.35 0.04 
1680 Bedfordshire 0.53 0.33 0.14 0.56 0.37 0.07 
1690 Bedfordshire 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.58 0.34 0.08 
1700 Bedfordshire 0.58 0.27 0.15 0.61 0.32 0.07 
1710 Bedfordshire 0.51 0.30 0.19 0.55 0.35 0.10 
1720 Bedfordshire 0.52 0.27 0.21 0.56 0.33 0.11 
1730 Bedfordshire 0.52 0.27 0.21 0.57 0.33 0.11 
1740 Bedfordshire 0.50 0.32 0.18 0.55 0.38 0.07 
1750 Bedfordshire 0.51 0.29 0.20 0.57 0.35 0.08 
1760 Bedfordshire 0.58 0.25 0.17 0.64 0.32 0.05 
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1770 Bedfordshire 0.59 0.24 0.18 0.65 0.31 0.04 
1780 Bedfordshire 0.56 0.25 0.19 0.63 0.32 0.05 
1520 Berkshire 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.52 0.30 0.18 
1530 Berkshire 0.72 0.16 0.12 0.72 0.20 0.08 
1540 Berkshire 0.70 0.19 0.12 0.70 0.24 0.06 
1550 Berkshire 0.68 0.26 0.07 0.68 0.30 0.02 
1560 Berkshire 0.69 0.22 0.09 0.68 0.27 0.05 
1570 Berkshire 0.72 0.21 0.07 0.72 0.26 0.03 
1580 Berkshire 0.72 0.21 0.07 0.71 0.26 0.03 
1590 Berkshire 0.70 0.23 0.07 0.69 0.28 0.03 
1600 Berkshire 0.67 0.24 0.09 0.67 0.29 0.04 
1610 Berkshire 0.66 0.24 0.10 0.65 0.29 0.06 
1620 Berkshire 0.65 0.25 0.10 0.65 0.31 0.04 
1630 Berkshire 0.64 0.25 0.11 0.64 0.31 0.05 
1640 Berkshire 0.63 0.27 0.10 0.63 0.33 0.04 
1650 Berkshire 0.59 0.28 0.13 0.59 0.34 0.07 
1660 Berkshire 0.56 0.31 0.12 0.57 0.37 0.06 
1670 Berkshire 0.56 0.32 0.12 0.57 0.38 0.06 
1680 Berkshire 0.52 0.32 0.15 0.53 0.38 0.09 
1690 Berkshire 0.55 0.32 0.13 0.56 0.38 0.06 
1700 Berkshire 0.53 0.31 0.16 0.54 0.38 0.08 
1710 Berkshire 0.49 0.32 0.19 0.50 0.39 0.11 
1720 Berkshire 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.45 0.42 0.13 
1730 Berkshire 0.44 0.32 0.24 0.46 0.39 0.14 
1740 Berkshire 0.47 0.32 0.21 0.49 0.40 0.10 
1750 Berkshire 0.44 0.29 0.27 0.47 0.38 0.15 
1760 Berkshire 0.42 0.34 0.24 0.46 0.43 0.12 
1770 Berkshire 0.47 0.29 0.24 0.51 0.38 0.10 
1780 Berkshire 0.43 0.31 0.26 0.47 0.41 0.12 
1640 Breconshire 0.77 0.18 0.06 0.74 0.22 0.05 
1650 Breconshire 0.80 0.15 0.05 0.77 0.19 0.04 
1660 Breconshire 0.80 0.15 0.05 0.77 0.20 0.03 
1670 Breconshire 0.79 0.16 0.05 0.76 0.21 0.03 
1680 Breconshire 0.79 0.13 0.08 0.76 0.18 0.06 
1690 Breconshire 0.78 0.13 0.09 0.76 0.18 0.06 
1700 Breconshire 0.80 0.14 0.06 0.77 0.19 0.03 
1710 Breconshire 0.75 0.16 0.09 0.73 0.21 0.06 
1720 Breconshire 0.78 0.15 0.07 0.76 0.20 0.04 
1730 Breconshire 0.67 0.18 0.15 0.65 0.23 0.11 
1740 Breconshire 0.64 0.19 0.17 0.63 0.25 0.12 
1750 Breconshire 0.75 0.13 0.12 0.73 0.19 0.08 
1760 Breconshire 0.69 0.19 0.11 0.68 0.25 0.07 
1770 Breconshire 0.72 0.17 0.11 0.71 0.23 0.06 
1780 Breconshire 0.68 0.16 0.17 0.66 0.22 0.12 
1520 Buckinghamshire 0.76 0.09 0.16 0.77 0.12 0.11 
1530 Buckinghamshire 0.77 0.09 0.14 0.77 0.12 0.11 
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1540 Buckinghamshire 0.80 0.14 0.06 0.79 0.18 0.03 
1550 Buckinghamshire 0.76 0.18 0.06 0.74 0.23 0.03 
1560 Buckinghamshire 0.79 0.15 0.06 0.77 0.20 0.03 
1570 Buckinghamshire 0.78 0.16 0.06 0.76 0.20 0.04 
1580 Buckinghamshire 0.77 0.17 0.07 0.74 0.22 0.04 
1590 Buckinghamshire 0.76 0.17 0.07 0.73 0.22 0.04 
1600 Buckinghamshire 0.69 0.21 0.10 0.67 0.26 0.07 
1610 Buckinghamshire 0.72 0.20 0.08 0.69 0.24 0.06 
1620 Buckinghamshire 0.72 0.19 0.09 0.70 0.24 0.06 
1630 Buckinghamshire 0.73 0.18 0.09 0.71 0.23 0.05 
1640 Caernarvonshire 0.63 0.15 0.23 0.67 0.21 0.12 
1650 Caernarvonshire 0.65 0.14 0.21 0.69 0.20 0.12 
1660 Caernarvonshire 0.65 0.18 0.18 0.68 0.23 0.09 
1670 Caernarvonshire 0.80 0.10 0.10 0.82 0.16 0.02 
1690 Caernarvonshire 0.74 0.14 0.13 0.75 0.19 0.05 
1700 Caernarvonshire 0.78 0.13 0.09 0.79 0.18 0.03 
1710 Caernarvonshire 0.68 0.17 0.15 0.69 0.22 0.09 
1720 Caernarvonshire 0.75 0.14 0.11 0.76 0.19 0.05 
1730 Caernarvonshire 0.72 0.15 0.13 0.72 0.20 0.07 
1740 Caernarvonshire 0.73 0.16 0.11 0.74 0.21 0.05 
1750 Caernarvonshire 0.83 0.09 0.08 0.84 0.14 0.02 
1760 Caernarvonshire 0.78 0.12 0.10 0.80 0.17 0.04 
1770 Caernarvonshire 0.75 0.12 0.14 0.77 0.16 0.07 
1780 Caernarvonshire 0.75 0.09 0.16 0.78 0.13 0.09 
1520 Cambridgeshire 0.61 0.14 0.25 0.64 0.17 0.19 
1530 Cambridgeshire 0.76 0.08 0.16 0.77 0.12 0.11 
1540 Cambridgeshire 0.71 0.16 0.13 0.72 0.20 0.08 
1550 Cambridgeshire 0.75 0.16 0.09 0.76 0.20 0.04 
1560 Cambridgeshire 0.72 0.17 0.11 0.72 0.20 0.08 
1570 Cambridgeshire 0.72 0.20 0.08 0.72 0.23 0.05 
1580 Cambridgeshire 0.70 0.21 0.09 0.70 0.26 0.04 
1590 Cambridgeshire 0.66 0.25 0.08 0.66 0.28 0.06 
1600 Cambridgeshire 0.69 0.23 0.08 0.68 0.27 0.04 
1610 Cambridgeshire 0.66 0.24 0.10 0.65 0.28 0.07 
1620 Cambridgeshire 0.70 0.22 0.08 0.69 0.27 0.04 
1630 Cambridgeshire 0.68 0.23 0.09 0.67 0.29 0.04 
1640 Cambridgeshire 0.63 0.27 0.10 0.63 0.31 0.06 
1650 Cambridgeshire 0.65 0.26 0.10 0.64 0.31 0.05 
1660 Cambridgeshire 0.61 0.27 0.12 0.61 0.32 0.07 
1670 Cambridgeshire 0.61 0.27 0.12 0.61 0.32 0.07 
1680 Cambridgeshire 0.56 0.30 0.15 0.56 0.35 0.10 
1690 Cambridgeshire 0.56 0.29 0.16 0.56 0.33 0.11 
1700 Cambridgeshire 0.56 0.31 0.13 0.56 0.36 0.08 
1710 Cambridgeshire 0.54 0.30 0.16 0.55 0.35 0.10 
1720 Cambridgeshire 0.52 0.29 0.18 0.54 0.35 0.12 
1730 Cambridgeshire 0.54 0.29 0.17 0.55 0.35 0.10 
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1740 Cambridgeshire 0.57 0.24 0.19 0.59 0.30 0.11 
1750 Cambridgeshire 0.53 0.25 0.22 0.55 0.31 0.14 
1760 Cambridgeshire 0.57 0.26 0.18 0.59 0.32 0.09 
1770 Cambridgeshire 0.54 0.24 0.22 0.57 0.30 0.12 
1780 Cambridgeshire 0.58 0.21 0.21 0.61 0.27 0.12 
1590 Cardiganshire 0.81 0.03 0.16 0.83 0.05 0.12 
1600 Cardiganshire 0.80 0.07 0.13 0.82 0.09 0.09 
1610 Cardiganshire 0.87 0.08 0.05 0.89 0.10 0.01 
1640 Cardiganshire 0.82 0.07 0.10 0.84 0.09 0.06 
1650 Cardiganshire 0.80 0.13 0.07 0.81 0.15 0.03 
1660 Cardiganshire 0.86 0.05 0.09 0.88 0.07 0.05 
1670 Cardiganshire 0.77 0.07 0.16 0.79 0.10 0.11 
1680 Cardiganshire 0.84 0.10 0.06 0.86 0.12 0.01 
1690 Cardiganshire 0.77 0.14 0.10 0.79 0.17 0.04 
1700 Cardiganshire 0.81 0.07 0.12 0.83 0.10 0.06 
1710 Cardiganshire 0.69 0.12 0.19 0.72 0.15 0.13 
1720 Cardiganshire 0.75 0.08 0.17 0.79 0.11 0.10 
1730 Cardiganshire 0.67 0.10 0.24 0.70 0.13 0.17 
1740 Cardiganshire 0.64 0.15 0.21 0.67 0.18 0.14 
1750 Cardiganshire 0.58 0.12 0.30 0.62 0.15 0.22 
1760 Cardiganshire 0.73 0.10 0.17 0.78 0.14 0.09 
1770 Cardiganshire 0.70 0.12 0.17 0.75 0.16 0.09 
1780 Cardiganshire 0.68 0.14 0.18 0.73 0.17 0.10 
1580 Carmarthenshire 0.70 0.21 0.09 0.72 0.24 0.04 
1590 Carmarthenshire 0.80 0.08 0.13 0.81 0.11 0.08 
1600 Carmarthenshire 0.80 0.06 0.14 0.82 0.09 0.09 
1610 Carmarthenshire 0.73 0.09 0.18 0.75 0.12 0.13 
1620 Carmarthenshire 0.80 0.09 0.11 0.82 0.12 0.06 
1640 Carmarthenshire 0.77 0.13 0.10 0.79 0.16 0.05 
1650 Carmarthenshire 0.83 0.09 0.08 0.84 0.12 0.03 
1660 Carmarthenshire 0.75 0.13 0.12 0.77 0.16 0.07 
1670 Carmarthenshire 0.72 0.12 0.16 0.74 0.15 0.10 
1680 Carmarthenshire 0.79 0.10 0.12 0.81 0.13 0.06 
1690 Carmarthenshire 0.75 0.12 0.13 0.77 0.15 0.07 
1700 Carmarthenshire 0.79 0.12 0.09 0.80 0.16 0.04 
1710 Carmarthenshire 0.71 0.17 0.12 0.73 0.20 0.07 
1720 Carmarthenshire 0.64 0.15 0.21 0.67 0.19 0.14 
1730 Carmarthenshire 0.63 0.18 0.19 0.66 0.22 0.12 
1740 Carmarthenshire 0.65 0.15 0.20 0.68 0.19 0.13 
1750 Carmarthenshire 0.75 0.12 0.13 0.77 0.16 0.07 
1760 Carmarthenshire 0.72 0.14 0.14 0.74 0.18 0.08 
1770 Carmarthenshire 0.72 0.13 0.15 0.75 0.17 0.08 
1780 Carmarthenshire 0.73 0.13 0.14 0.75 0.17 0.08 
1570 Cheshire 0.85 0.08 0.07 0.85 0.12 0.04 
1580 Cheshire 0.76 0.12 0.12 0.76 0.15 0.09 
1590 Cheshire 0.79 0.13 0.08 0.79 0.15 0.06 
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1600 Cheshire 0.78 0.13 0.09 0.78 0.16 0.06 
1610 Cheshire 0.79 0.10 0.10 0.79 0.14 0.07 
1620 Cheshire 0.76 0.14 0.10 0.76 0.18 0.06 
1640 Cheshire 0.69 0.18 0.12 0.70 0.22 0.08 
1650 Cheshire 0.70 0.18 0.12 0.70 0.21 0.09 
1660 Cheshire 0.70 0.17 0.13 0.70 0.21 0.09 
1670 Cheshire 0.68 0.19 0.13 0.69 0.22 0.09 
1680 Cheshire 0.64 0.20 0.16 0.65 0.24 0.11 
1690 Cheshire 0.64 0.20 0.15 0.65 0.25 0.10 
1700 Cheshire 0.68 0.19 0.13 0.69 0.23 0.09 
1710 Cheshire 0.64 0.19 0.16 0.65 0.23 0.12 
1720 Cheshire 0.57 0.22 0.21 0.58 0.27 0.14 
1730 Cheshire 0.58 0.23 0.19 0.59 0.28 0.12 
1740 Cheshire 0.56 0.26 0.18 0.58 0.30 0.12 
1750 Cheshire 0.59 0.22 0.18 0.60 0.27 0.13 
1760 Cheshire 0.57 0.24 0.20 0.58 0.29 0.13 
1770 Cheshire 0.54 0.27 0.19 0.55 0.33 0.12 
1780 Cheshire 0.54 0.25 0.21 0.55 0.31 0.14 
1610 Cumberland 0.82 0.10 0.09 0.83 0.13 0.04 
1640 Cumberland 0.77 0.14 0.09 0.78 0.17 0.05 
1650 Cumberland 0.80 0.14 0.07 0.80 0.17 0.03 
1660 Cumberland 0.78 0.15 0.07 0.79 0.19 0.02 
1670 Cumberland 0.85 0.09 0.06 0.86 0.13 0.02 
1680 Cumberland 0.76 0.11 0.13 0.78 0.15 0.07 
1690 Cumberland 0.76 0.12 0.11 0.78 0.16 0.06 
1700 Cumberland 0.80 0.10 0.09 0.82 0.14 0.04 
1710 Cumberland 0.73 0.15 0.12 0.75 0.19 0.06 
1720 Cumberland 0.66 0.19 0.15 0.70 0.23 0.08 
1550 Denbighshire 0.76 0.05 0.19 0.76 0.07 0.17 
1610 Denbighshire 0.65 0.22 0.13 0.65 0.24 0.11 
1620 Denbighshire 0.70 0.17 0.13 0.69 0.19 0.11 
1640 Denbighshire 0.55 0.27 0.18 0.55 0.29 0.17 
1650 Denbighshire 0.61 0.26 0.12 0.60 0.28 0.11 
1660 Denbighshire 0.66 0.19 0.15 0.65 0.22 0.13 
1670 Denbighshire 0.70 0.17 0.13 0.69 0.19 0.12 
1680 Denbighshire 0.73 0.17 0.09 0.72 0.20 0.08 
1690 Denbighshire 0.71 0.18 0.11 0.70 0.20 0.10 
1700 Denbighshire 0.72 0.19 0.09 0.71 0.21 0.08 
1710 Denbighshire 0.69 0.19 0.12 0.68 0.21 0.11 
1720 Denbighshire 0.64 0.24 0.13 0.63 0.26 0.11 
1730 Denbighshire 0.65 0.21 0.14 0.64 0.23 0.13 
1740 Denbighshire 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.68 0.22 0.09 
1750 Denbighshire 0.70 0.17 0.13 0.69 0.19 0.12 
1760 Denbighshire 0.74 0.13 0.12 0.73 0.16 0.11 
1770 Denbighshire 0.71 0.18 0.11 0.70 0.20 0.10 
1780 Denbighshire 0.65 0.19 0.16 0.64 0.21 0.15 
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1640 Derbyshire 0.64 0.27 0.09 0.64 0.32 0.04 
1650 Derbyshire 0.65 0.25 0.10 0.65 0.30 0.05 
1560 Durham 0.67 0.15 0.17 0.69 0.19 0.12 
1590 Durham 0.68 0.18 0.15 0.69 0.22 0.09 
1610 Durham 0.73 0.17 0.09 0.74 0.22 0.04 
1640 Durham 0.58 0.28 0.14 0.60 0.33 0.07 
1650 Durham 0.57 0.31 0.12 0.59 0.35 0.06 
1660 Durham 0.62 0.28 0.10 0.63 0.33 0.04 
1670 Durham 0.41 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.36 0.20 
1680 Durham 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.43 0.33 0.24 
1690 Durham 0.56 0.24 0.21 0.58 0.29 0.13 
1700 Durham 0.56 0.28 0.16 0.58 0.33 0.08 
1710 Durham 0.49 0.28 0.23 0.52 0.33 0.15 
1720 Durham 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.24 
1730 Durham 0.43 0.32 0.25 0.47 0.37 0.16 
1740 Durham 0.45 0.30 0.24 0.49 0.36 0.16 
1750 Durham 0.45 0.30 0.25 0.49 0.35 0.16 
1760 Durham 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.35 0.23 
1770 Durham 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.23 
1780 Durham 0.37 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.35 0.24 
1520 Essex 0.58 0.25 0.16 0.60 0.28 0.12 
1530 Essex 0.66 0.22 0.12 0.67 0.24 0.09 
1540 Essex 0.68 0.21 0.12 0.69 0.23 0.08 
1550 Essex 0.65 0.21 0.14 0.66 0.24 0.10 
1560 Essex 0.66 0.22 0.11 0.67 0.25 0.09 
1570 Essex 0.64 0.24 0.11 0.65 0.26 0.08 
1580 Essex 0.66 0.22 0.11 0.67 0.25 0.08 
1590 Essex 0.68 0.22 0.09 0.69 0.24 0.06 
1600 Essex 0.66 0.24 0.10 0.66 0.27 0.07 
1610 Essex 0.67 0.24 0.09 0.68 0.26 0.06 
1620 Essex 0.65 0.25 0.11 0.66 0.28 0.07 
1630 Essex 0.62 0.25 0.13 0.63 0.28 0.09 
1640 Essex 0.58 0.32 0.10 0.60 0.34 0.06 
1650 Essex 0.57 0.28 0.15 0.59 0.31 0.11 
1660 Essex 0.51 0.32 0.17 0.53 0.35 0.12 
1670 Essex 0.50 0.29 0.22 0.52 0.32 0.16 
1680 Essex 0.51 0.29 0.19 0.54 0.32 0.14 
1690 Essex 0.51 0.30 0.19 0.53 0.33 0.14 
1700 Essex 0.54 0.28 0.18 0.57 0.31 0.13 
1710 Essex 0.51 0.28 0.21 0.53 0.31 0.16 
1720 Essex 0.48 0.30 0.22 0.51 0.33 0.16 
1730 Essex 0.50 0.27 0.24 0.53 0.30 0.18 
1740 Essex 0.53 0.27 0.21 0.56 0.30 0.15 
1750 Essex 0.55 0.22 0.23 0.58 0.25 0.17 
1760 Essex 0.51 0.26 0.23 0.54 0.30 0.17 
1770 Essex 0.54 0.24 0.22 0.57 0.27 0.16 
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1780 Essex 0.55 0.25 0.20 0.58 0.28 0.14 
1560 Flintshire 0.78 0.07 0.15 0.79 0.12 0.10 
1590 Flintshire 0.83 0.15 0.02 0.84 0.19 -0.04 
1600 Flintshire 0.81 0.16 0.02 0.83 0.21 -0.04 
1610 Flintshire 0.81 0.07 0.12 0.82 0.12 0.06 
1620 Flintshire 0.68 0.13 0.20 0.69 0.18 0.13 
1640 Flintshire 0.72 0.11 0.17 0.73 0.16 0.11 
1650 Flintshire 0.72 0.14 0.14 0.73 0.20 0.08 
1660 Flintshire 0.69 0.14 0.17 0.70 0.20 0.10 
1670 Flintshire 0.74 0.14 0.13 0.74 0.20 0.06 
1680 Flintshire 0.71 0.12 0.18 0.71 0.18 0.10 
1690 Flintshire 0.84 0.09 0.07 0.84 0.16 0.01 
1700 Flintshire 0.71 0.18 0.11 0.71 0.24 0.04 
1710 Flintshire 0.71 0.21 0.09 0.71 0.27 0.02 
1720 Flintshire 0.64 0.25 0.11 0.65 0.32 0.04 
1730 Flintshire 0.60 0.28 0.12 0.61 0.35 0.04 
1740 Flintshire 0.61 0.28 0.11 0.62 0.35 0.03 
1750 Flintshire 0.68 0.20 0.12 0.68 0.27 0.05 
1760 Flintshire 0.65 0.22 0.13 0.65 0.30 0.06 
1770 Flintshire 0.65 0.23 0.12 0.64 0.31 0.05 
1780 Flintshire 0.61 0.25 0.14 0.60 0.33 0.07 
1610 Glamorganshire 0.65 0.17 0.18 0.67 0.21 0.12 
1620 Glamorganshire 0.70 0.12 0.18 0.72 0.16 0.11 
1630 Glamorganshire 0.77 0.08 0.15 0.79 0.13 0.08 
1640 Glamorganshire 0.74 0.13 0.13 0.75 0.18 0.07 
1650 Glamorganshire 0.67 0.12 0.21 0.69 0.16 0.15 
1660 Glamorganshire 0.65 0.18 0.17 0.67 0.22 0.10 
1670 Glamorganshire 0.69 0.13 0.18 0.70 0.17 0.12 
1680 Glamorganshire 0.70 0.13 0.18 0.72 0.17 0.12 
1690 Glamorganshire 0.66 0.14 0.20 0.68 0.19 0.13 
1700 Glamorganshire 0.69 0.15 0.16 0.71 0.19 0.10 
1710 Glamorganshire 0.60 0.21 0.18 0.63 0.26 0.11 
1720 Glamorganshire 0.58 0.12 0.30 0.60 0.17 0.23 
1730 Glamorganshire 0.61 0.20 0.19 0.63 0.25 0.12 
1740 Glamorganshire 0.63 0.16 0.21 0.66 0.21 0.14 
1750 Glamorganshire 0.65 0.15 0.21 0.67 0.20 0.13 
1760 Glamorganshire 0.66 0.15 0.19 0.69 0.20 0.12 
1770 Glamorganshire 0.63 0.15 0.22 0.65 0.20 0.14 
1780 Glamorganshire 0.64 0.18 0.17 0.66 0.24 0.11 
1530 Gloucestershire 0.62 0.18 0.20 0.64 0.20 0.15 
1540 Gloucestershire 0.69 0.18 0.13 0.71 0.21 0.09 
1550 Gloucestershire 0.65 0.23 0.12 0.66 0.25 0.09 
1560 Gloucestershire 0.67 0.22 0.11 0.68 0.24 0.08 
1570 Gloucestershire 0.71 0.20 0.09 0.72 0.22 0.06 
1580 Gloucestershire 0.71 0.21 0.08 0.72 0.24 0.05 
1590 Gloucestershire 0.68 0.23 0.09 0.69 0.25 0.06 
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1600 Gloucestershire 0.69 0.21 0.10 0.70 0.24 0.06 
1610 Gloucestershire 0.66 0.22 0.13 0.66 0.24 0.09 
1620 Gloucestershire 0.59 0.27 0.14 0.60 0.30 0.10 
1630 Gloucestershire 0.61 0.25 0.15 0.62 0.28 0.10 
1640 Gloucestershire 0.58 0.28 0.14 0.60 0.30 0.10 
1650 Gloucestershire 0.53 0.32 0.14 0.55 0.35 0.10 
1660 Gloucestershire 0.51 0.33 0.16 0.52 0.36 0.12 
1670 Gloucestershire 0.48 0.34 0.18 0.50 0.37 0.14 
1680 Gloucestershire 0.43 0.38 0.19 0.45 0.40 0.15 
1690 Gloucestershire 0.47 0.37 0.16 0.49 0.39 0.12 
1700 Gloucestershire 0.48 0.38 0.14 0.50 0.40 0.09 
1710 Gloucestershire 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.43 0.43 0.14 
1720 Gloucestershire 0.36 0.40 0.24 0.39 0.44 0.17 
1730 Gloucestershire 0.34 0.40 0.25 0.38 0.44 0.18 
1740 Gloucestershire 0.39 0.39 0.22 0.43 0.43 0.14 
1750 Gloucestershire 0.20 0.34 0.47 0.24 0.38 0.38 
1760 Gloucestershire 0.21 0.34 0.45 0.25 0.40 0.35 
1770 Gloucestershire 0.17 0.31 0.51 0.21 0.37 0.42 
1540 Hampshire 0.66 0.19 0.15 0.66 0.23 0.11 
1550 Hampshire 0.71 0.19 0.10 0.70 0.23 0.07 
1560 Hampshire 0.74 0.18 0.09 0.73 0.22 0.05 
1570 Hampshire 0.73 0.19 0.08 0.73 0.23 0.04 
1580 Hampshire 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.74 0.21 0.05 
1590 Hampshire 0.77 0.16 0.07 0.76 0.20 0.03 
1600 Hampshire 0.73 0.19 0.08 0.73 0.24 0.04 
1610 Hampshire 0.74 0.19 0.07 0.74 0.23 0.03 
1620 Hampshire 0.71 0.21 0.08 0.71 0.25 0.03 
1630 Hampshire 0.66 0.20 0.15 0.66 0.24 0.09 
1640 Hampshire 0.66 0.22 0.13 0.66 0.26 0.07 
1650 Hampshire 0.59 0.26 0.14 0.60 0.31 0.09 
1660 Hampshire 0.61 0.26 0.12 0.62 0.31 0.07 
1670 Hampshire 0.54 0.29 0.17 0.55 0.34 0.11 
1680 Hampshire 0.49 0.28 0.22 0.51 0.33 0.16 
1690 Hampshire 0.49 0.28 0.23 0.51 0.32 0.17 
1700 Hampshire 0.46 0.31 0.23 0.47 0.35 0.17 
1710 Hampshire 0.46 0.30 0.24 0.48 0.35 0.17 
1720 Hampshire 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.25 
1730 Hampshire 0.40 0.36 0.23 0.43 0.41 0.16 
1740 Hampshire 0.42 0.37 0.22 0.44 0.42 0.14 
1750 Hampshire 0.42 0.35 0.23 0.44 0.41 0.15 
1760 Hampshire 0.38 0.36 0.26 0.41 0.43 0.16 
1770 Hampshire 0.38 0.36 0.27 0.41 0.42 0.17 
1520 Herefordshire 0.75 0.05 0.20 0.81 0.07 0.12 
1530 Herefordshire 0.76 0.07 0.17 0.79 0.09 0.11 
1540 Herefordshire 0.80 0.07 0.13 0.82 0.10 0.08 
1550 Herefordshire 0.81 0.08 0.11 0.82 0.10 0.07 
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1560 Herefordshire 0.83 0.11 0.06 0.83 0.14 0.03 
1570 Herefordshire 0.81 0.15 0.04 0.81 0.17 0.01 
1580 Herefordshire 0.79 0.15 0.06 0.79 0.18 0.03 
1590 Herefordshire 0.80 0.15 0.04 0.79 0.19 0.02 
1600 Herefordshire 0.81 0.13 0.06 0.80 0.17 0.03 
1610 Herefordshire 0.77 0.16 0.07 0.76 0.20 0.04 
1620 Herefordshire 0.76 0.16 0.09 0.75 0.20 0.05 
1630 Herefordshire 0.77 0.15 0.08 0.76 0.20 0.04 
1640 Herefordshire 0.73 0.20 0.07 0.72 0.24 0.04 
1650 Herefordshire 0.72 0.20 0.07 0.72 0.23 0.05 
1660 Herefordshire 0.73 0.20 0.06 0.73 0.24 0.04 
1670 Herefordshire 0.74 0.18 0.08 0.74 0.22 0.04 
1520 Hertfordshire 0.65 0.16 0.20 0.67 0.19 0.14 
1530 Hertfordshire 0.77 0.14 0.09 0.78 0.17 0.05 
1540 Hertfordshire 0.62 0.24 0.14 0.64 0.27 0.09 
1550 Hertfordshire 0.51 0.34 0.14 0.54 0.37 0.10 
1560 Hertfordshire 0.65 0.26 0.09 0.67 0.29 0.05 
1570 Hertfordshire 0.66 0.25 0.08 0.68 0.28 0.04 
1580 Hertfordshire 0.66 0.27 0.08 0.67 0.29 0.04 
1590 Hertfordshire 0.63 0.28 0.09 0.64 0.30 0.06 
1600 Hertfordshire 0.60 0.28 0.12 0.61 0.31 0.08 
1610 Hertfordshire 0.62 0.26 0.12 0.64 0.28 0.08 
1620 Hertfordshire 0.62 0.24 0.14 0.64 0.28 0.08 
1630 Hertfordshire 0.64 0.25 0.11 0.66 0.28 0.06 
1640 Hertfordshire 0.58 0.31 0.11 0.60 0.33 0.06 
1650 Hertfordshire 0.51 0.33 0.15 0.54 0.36 0.10 
1660 Hertfordshire 0.49 0.33 0.17 0.52 0.36 0.11 
1670 Hertfordshire 0.49 0.35 0.16 0.52 0.38 0.10 
1680 Hertfordshire 0.49 0.29 0.22 0.52 0.33 0.15 
1690 Hertfordshire 0.46 0.34 0.20 0.50 0.37 0.14 
1700 Hertfordshire 0.47 0.33 0.20 0.51 0.36 0.13 
1710 Hertfordshire 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.44 0.38 0.18 
1720 Hertfordshire 0.35 0.39 0.26 0.40 0.42 0.18 
1730 Hertfordshire 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.43 0.37 0.21 
1740 Hertfordshire 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.42 0.39 0.19 
1750 Hertfordshire 0.41 0.33 0.26 0.46 0.37 0.17 
1760 Hertfordshire 0.42 0.30 0.28 0.47 0.34 0.19 
1770 Hertfordshire 0.42 0.29 0.29 0.47 0.34 0.19 
1780 Hertfordshire 0.42 0.30 0.28 0.47 0.35 0.18 
1640 Lancashire 0.82 0.14 0.04 0.81 0.17 0.02 
1650 Lancashire 0.78 0.16 0.07 0.77 0.19 0.05 
1700 Lancashire 0.76 0.15 0.09 0.76 0.19 0.05 
1710 Lancashire 0.61 0.21 0.18 0.63 0.25 0.12 
1610 Merionethshire 0.65 0.20 0.15 0.66 0.24 0.11 
1640 Merionethshire 0.79 0.09 0.12 0.79 0.12 0.09 
1650 Merionethshire 0.84 0.13 0.03 0.83 0.16 0.01 
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1660 Merionethshire 0.85 0.07 0.08 0.84 0.10 0.06 
1670 Merionethshire 0.84 0.13 0.03 0.83 0.16 0.01 
1680 Merionethshire 0.79 0.13 0.07 0.78 0.16 0.05 
1690 Merionethshire 0.86 0.08 0.06 0.85 0.11 0.04 
1700 Merionethshire 0.87 0.09 0.03 0.86 0.13 0.01 
1710 Merionethshire 0.86 0.08 0.07 0.84 0.11 0.05 
1720 Merionethshire 0.77 0.14 0.09 0.77 0.17 0.07 
1730 Merionethshire 0.77 0.15 0.08 0.76 0.18 0.06 
1740 Merionethshire 0.82 0.11 0.07 0.81 0.14 0.05 
1750 Merionethshire 0.80 0.12 0.08 0.79 0.15 0.06 
1760 Merionethshire 0.83 0.08 0.09 0.82 0.11 0.06 
1770 Merionethshire 0.81 0.10 0.10 0.80 0.13 0.07 
1780 Merionethshire 0.72 0.15 0.13 0.72 0.18 0.10 
1560 Montgomeryshire 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.78 0.24 -0.02 
1610 Montgomeryshire 0.72 0.19 0.09 0.71 0.23 0.06 
1620 Montgomeryshire 0.63 0.21 0.16 0.63 0.25 0.12 
1630 Montgomeryshire 0.75 0.18 0.07 0.74 0.23 0.03 
1640 Montgomeryshire 0.69 0.20 0.11 0.69 0.24 0.07 
1650 Montgomeryshire 0.71 0.19 0.09 0.71 0.23 0.06 
1660 Montgomeryshire 0.72 0.22 0.07 0.72 0.25 0.03 
1670 Montgomeryshire 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.74 0.21 0.04 
1680 Montgomeryshire 0.81 0.12 0.07 0.81 0.17 0.03 
1690 Montgomeryshire 0.78 0.13 0.09 0.78 0.17 0.05 
1700 Montgomeryshire 0.75 0.19 0.07 0.75 0.23 0.03 
1710 Montgomeryshire 0.74 0.17 0.10 0.74 0.21 0.05 
1720 Montgomeryshire 0.67 0.23 0.10 0.68 0.27 0.05 
1730 Montgomeryshire 0.74 0.17 0.09 0.75 0.21 0.04 
1740 Montgomeryshire 0.67 0.19 0.13 0.68 0.24 0.08 
1750 Montgomeryshire 0.71 0.17 0.12 0.72 0.22 0.07 
1760 Montgomeryshire 0.79 0.13 0.08 0.79 0.18 0.03 
1770 Montgomeryshire 0.68 0.18 0.15 0.69 0.22 0.09 
1780 Montgomeryshire 0.69 0.17 0.15 0.70 0.21 0.09 
1560 Northumberland 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.44 0.35 0.21 
1590 Northumberland 0.48 0.29 0.23 0.52 0.34 0.14 
1610 Northumberland 0.44 0.29 0.27 0.48 0.34 0.18 
1640 Northumberland 0.42 0.30 0.28 0.46 0.35 0.19 
1650 Northumberland 0.40 0.31 0.29 0.45 0.36 0.20 
1660 Northumberland 0.46 0.33 0.22 0.50 0.38 0.12 
1670 Northumberland 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.41 0.34 0.25 
1680 Northumberland 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.28 
1780 Northumberland 0.40 0.24 0.36 0.46 0.28 0.26 
1520 Oxfordshire 0.53 0.10 0.37 0.58 0.15 0.28 
1530 Oxfordshire 0.62 0.11 0.27 0.64 0.14 0.21 
1540 Oxfordshire 0.68 0.16 0.16 0.71 0.20 0.08 
1550 Oxfordshire 0.65 0.17 0.17 0.67 0.22 0.11 
1560 Oxfordshire 0.72 0.19 0.09 0.73 0.23 0.05 
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1570 Oxfordshire 0.73 0.18 0.09 0.73 0.23 0.04 
1580 Oxfordshire 0.72 0.20 0.08 0.72 0.25 0.03 
1590 Oxfordshire 0.69 0.22 0.09 0.68 0.27 0.05 
1600 Oxfordshire 0.66 0.25 0.09 0.66 0.30 0.04 
1610 Oxfordshire 0.65 0.25 0.10 0.64 0.29 0.06 
1620 Oxfordshire 0.61 0.26 0.13 0.60 0.32 0.08 
1630 Oxfordshire 0.68 0.20 0.13 0.67 0.27 0.07 
1640 Oxfordshire 0.60 0.27 0.13 0.59 0.33 0.08 
1650 Oxfordshire 0.57 0.29 0.13 0.56 0.35 0.09 
1660 Oxfordshire 0.55 0.31 0.14 0.54 0.37 0.09 
1670 Oxfordshire 0.52 0.34 0.14 0.51 0.40 0.09 
1680 Oxfordshire 0.54 0.32 0.14 0.53 0.38 0.09 
1690 Oxfordshire 0.50 0.36 0.15 0.49 0.41 0.09 
1700 Oxfordshire 0.50 0.34 0.16 0.50 0.40 0.10 
1710 Oxfordshire 0.44 0.37 0.19 0.44 0.43 0.12 
1720 Oxfordshire 0.41 0.41 0.18 0.42 0.47 0.11 
1730 Oxfordshire 0.42 0.37 0.21 0.43 0.43 0.14 
1740 Oxfordshire 0.43 0.36 0.20 0.44 0.43 0.12 
1750 Oxfordshire 0.46 0.32 0.22 0.47 0.40 0.13 
1760 Oxfordshire 0.48 0.28 0.24 0.49 0.36 0.15 
1770 Oxfordshire 0.45 0.31 0.24 0.47 0.39 0.14 
1780 Oxfordshire 0.48 0.30 0.22 0.50 0.39 0.11 
1580 Pembrokeshire 0.81 0.08 0.12 0.81 0.10 0.09 
1590 Pembrokeshire 0.66 0.17 0.17 0.67 0.19 0.14 
1600 Pembrokeshire 0.80 0.09 0.11 0.82 0.12 0.07 
1640 Pembrokeshire 0.65 0.17 0.19 0.68 0.18 0.14 
1650 Pembrokeshire 0.60 0.19 0.21 0.63 0.20 0.17 
1660 Pembrokeshire 0.63 0.19 0.17 0.67 0.21 0.12 
1670 Pembrokeshire 0.62 0.15 0.22 0.66 0.17 0.17 
1680 Pembrokeshire 0.60 0.15 0.25 0.64 0.17 0.18 
1690 Pembrokeshire 0.54 0.11 0.35 0.58 0.14 0.28 
1700 Pembrokeshire 0.57 0.14 0.29 0.62 0.16 0.22 
1710 Pembrokeshire 0.55 0.10 0.34 0.60 0.13 0.27 
1720 Pembrokeshire 0.33 0.10 0.57 0.39 0.13 0.49 
1730 Pembrokeshire 0.42 0.12 0.46 0.48 0.15 0.38 
1740 Pembrokeshire 0.37 0.17 0.46 0.42 0.19 0.38 
1750 Pembrokeshire 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.56 0.27 0.18 
1770 Pembrokeshire 0.58 0.17 0.25 0.62 0.19 0.19 
1780 Pembrokeshire 0.61 0.18 0.21 0.64 0.20 0.16 
1630 Radnorshire 0.83 0.09 0.08 0.84 0.12 0.04 
1640 Radnorshire 0.86 0.12 0.02 0.86 0.14 0.00 
1650 Radnorshire 0.82 0.12 0.06 0.83 0.13 0.04 
1660 Radnorshire 0.77 0.16 0.07 0.77 0.18 0.05 
1670 Radnorshire 0.83 0.12 0.05 0.83 0.14 0.03 
1680 Radnorshire 0.87 0.09 0.03 0.88 0.12 0.01 
1690 Radnorshire 0.82 0.12 0.06 0.82 0.14 0.03 
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1700 Radnorshire 0.87 0.09 0.04 0.88 0.11 0.01 
1710 Radnorshire 0.85 0.09 0.07 0.85 0.11 0.04 
1720 Radnorshire 0.85 0.11 0.04 0.85 0.13 0.02 
1730 Radnorshire 0.81 0.13 0.06 0.82 0.15 0.03 
1740 Radnorshire 0.82 0.14 0.05 0.83 0.16 0.02 
1750 Radnorshire 0.85 0.08 0.07 0.85 0.11 0.04 
1760 Radnorshire 0.75 0.19 0.05 0.77 0.21 0.02 
1770 Radnorshire 0.88 0.09 0.03 0.89 0.11 0.00 
1780 Radnorshire 0.83 0.07 0.10 0.84 0.10 0.06 
1640 Shropshire 0.57 0.28 0.14 0.59 0.33 0.08 
1650 Shropshire 0.62 0.25 0.14 0.63 0.30 0.07 
1660 Shropshire 0.53 0.32 0.15 0.55 0.37 0.08 
1520 Suffolk 0.53 0.29 0.18 0.57 0.33 0.10 
1530 Suffolk 0.57 0.24 0.19 0.59 0.27 0.13 
1540 Suffolk 0.57 0.26 0.17 0.60 0.30 0.10 
1550 Suffolk 0.60 0.25 0.16 0.62 0.28 0.10 
1560 Suffolk 0.60 0.25 0.14 0.62 0.28 0.09 
1570 Suffolk 0.64 0.26 0.11 0.66 0.29 0.06 
1580 Suffolk 0.64 0.25 0.12 0.66 0.28 0.06 
1590 Suffolk 0.64 0.25 0.11 0.65 0.28 0.07 
1600 Suffolk 0.64 0.25 0.11 0.66 0.28 0.06 
1610 Suffolk 0.62 0.26 0.12 0.64 0.28 0.08 
1620 Suffolk 0.60 0.26 0.14 0.62 0.30 0.08 
1630 Suffolk 0.60 0.25 0.15 0.63 0.29 0.09 
1640 Suffolk 0.58 0.29 0.13 0.60 0.32 0.08 
1650 Suffolk 0.53 0.31 0.16 0.56 0.34 0.10 
1660 Suffolk 0.51 0.32 0.17 0.54 0.35 0.10 
1670 Suffolk 0.48 0.32 0.21 0.51 0.35 0.13 
1540 Surrey 0.50 0.35 0.15 0.52 0.38 0.09 
1550 Surrey 0.57 0.28 0.14 0.60 0.32 0.08 
1560 Surrey 0.53 0.33 0.14 0.56 0.37 0.07 
1570 Surrey 0.56 0.29 0.14 0.60 0.33 0.07 
1580 Surrey 0.57 0.28 0.15 0.61 0.32 0.07 
1590 Surrey 0.57 0.26 0.16 0.61 0.31 0.08 
1600 Surrey 0.49 0.32 0.19 0.54 0.36 0.10 
1610 Surrey 0.59 0.26 0.15 0.64 0.31 0.05 
1620 Surrey 0.53 0.26 0.21 0.59 0.31 0.10 
1630 Surrey 0.47 0.31 0.21 0.54 0.36 0.10 
1640 Surrey 0.40 0.34 0.27 0.47 0.38 0.15 
1650 Surrey 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.44 0.37 0.19 
1660 Surrey 0.39 0.30 0.31 0.46 0.36 0.18 
1670 Surrey 0.27 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.33 0.33 
1680 Surrey 0.27 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.33 0.32 
1690 Surrey 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.26 
1700 Surrey 0.26 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.39 0.27 
1710 Surrey 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.24 
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1720 Surrey 0.21 0.36 0.43 0.29 0.42 0.29 
1730 Surrey 0.24 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.46 0.23 
1740 Surrey 0.26 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.45 0.22 
1750 Surrey 0.26 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.44 0.22 
1760 Surrey 0.26 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.43 0.23 
1770 Surrey 0.23 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.23 
1780 Surrey 0.24 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.45 0.23 
1630 Warwickshire 0.70 0.22 0.08 0.70 0.26 0.04 
1600 Westmorland 0.75 0.17 0.07 0.76 0.21 0.03 
1610 Westmorland 0.71 0.22 0.07 0.72 0.25 0.04 
1620 Westmorland 0.65 0.25 0.10 0.65 0.29 0.06 
1640 Westmorland 0.80 0.18 0.02 0.79 0.21 0.00 
1650 Westmorland 0.80 0.15 0.05 0.80 0.18 0.02 
1660 Westmorland 0.78 0.17 0.05 0.77 0.21 0.02 
1670 Westmorland 0.81 0.15 0.04 0.81 0.18 0.01 
1680 Westmorland 0.73 0.22 0.05 0.73 0.25 0.01 
1690 Westmorland 0.77 0.15 0.08 0.77 0.19 0.04 
1700 Westmorland 0.78 0.17 0.05 0.78 0.20 0.02 
1710 Westmorland 0.72 0.19 0.09 0.73 0.22 0.05 
1720 Westmorland 0.72 0.18 0.09 0.74 0.21 0.05 
1580 Wiltshire 0.72 0.22 0.06 0.72 0.26 0.03 
1590 Wiltshire 0.69 0.25 0.06 0.69 0.29 0.02 
1600 Wiltshire 0.68 0.25 0.07 0.68 0.30 0.03 
1610 Wiltshire 0.67 0.26 0.07 0.66 0.30 0.03 
1620 Wiltshire 0.63 0.27 0.10 0.64 0.32 0.05 
1630 Wiltshire 0.66 0.23 0.11 0.66 0.29 0.05 
1640 Wiltshire 0.64 0.26 0.10 0.64 0.32 0.04 
1650 Wiltshire 0.60 0.28 0.12 0.61 0.33 0.06 
1660 Wiltshire 0.58 0.31 0.11 0.59 0.36 0.05 
1670 Wiltshire 0.54 0.35 0.10 0.56 0.40 0.04 
1680 Wiltshire 0.51 0.37 0.12 0.54 0.42 0.04 
1690 Wiltshire 0.51 0.37 0.12 0.53 0.42 0.05 
1700 Wiltshire 0.48 0.38 0.14 0.51 0.43 0.06 
1710 Wiltshire 0.46 0.39 0.15 0.49 0.44 0.06 
1720 Wiltshire 0.42 0.38 0.20 0.46 0.44 0.10 
1730 Wiltshire 0.41 0.39 0.20 0.46 0.45 0.09 
1740 Wiltshire 0.42 0.37 0.21 0.47 0.44 0.09 
1750 Wiltshire 0.43 0.37 0.20 0.48 0.44 0.08 
1760 Wiltshire 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.49 0.42 0.09 
1770 Wiltshire 0.43 0.35 0.21 0.49 0.43 0.08 
1780 Wiltshire 0.47 0.31 0.22 0.53 0.39 0.09 
1520 Worcestershire 0.54 0.13 0.33 0.58 0.16 0.25 
1530 Worcestershire 0.63 0.14 0.23 0.64 0.17 0.19 
1540 Worcestershire 0.64 0.19 0.16 0.66 0.23 0.11 
1550 Worcestershire 0.68 0.18 0.14 0.68 0.21 0.11 
1560 Worcestershire 0.69 0.20 0.11 0.69 0.22 0.09 
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1570 Worcestershire 0.76 0.20 0.04 0.75 0.23 0.01 
1580 Worcestershire 0.73 0.20 0.07 0.72 0.24 0.04 
1590 Worcestershire 0.70 0.23 0.07 0.69 0.27 0.05 
1600 Worcestershire 0.70 0.22 0.08 0.69 0.26 0.05 
1610 Worcestershire 0.68 0.24 0.08 0.66 0.28 0.05 
1620 Worcestershire 0.63 0.24 0.13 0.62 0.29 0.09 
1630 Worcestershire 0.67 0.23 0.09 0.67 0.28 0.05 
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